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ABSTRACT
Divorce: A Matter of Rights and Responsibilities
by
Mary Jane Watson Brick
Dr. Alan Zundel, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f Political Science and 
Ethics and Policy Studies 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In 1970, American society, steeped in a culture that emphasizes individual rights, 
turned away from traditional fault-based divorce laws to embrace the easy, unilateral no­
fault divorce laws in place today -  divorce laws that have had unexpected and disastrous 
economic consequences for the children of divorce. During the 1990s, many political and 
social groups advocated divorce reform that would return divorce law to a more 
traditional, fault-based system; however, no significant revisions to the no-fault laws 
were passed, arguably because our cultural norms will not support a return to fault-based 
divorce. Recognizing the underlying political and ethical theories that have shaped our 
culture, and turning the focus away from one of limiting divorce to one of improving the 
circumstances of children of divorce may be the first steps in creating national-level 
public policy that can positively impact the worst outcomes o f divorce while presenting 
the best chance of passage into law.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Eva McNulty had been married to her husband Ralph for twenty-three years — none of 
which had been happy. Both o f the McNultys drank too much, they fought often, and Eva 
suspected Ralph of infidelity. Their marriage finally broke down when Eva discovered that 
Ralph had committed incest with then: 13-year old daughter. Ralph was prosecuted, 
convicted and sentenced to three to four years of hard labor. Eva sought divorce on the 
grounds of cruel and abusive treatment; her petition was denied. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Massachusetts, the decision was upheld because "incest with the 
daughter was not cruel or abusive to the wife, in either a physical or emotional sense."1 The 
court also denied the divorce on the basis o f adultery — even though adultery is clearly 
implicit in the facts — because Eva had not explicitly alleged adultery as grounds for the 
divorce.2
Barbara Welch thought she and Bill had it all — a comfortable marriage, two great 
daughters, and her job as a secretary to help them make ends meet That was until she came 
home one day to find her husband had beaten their oldest daughter and had left her a note
1 Michael Wheeler, No-Fault Divorce, (Boston; Beacon Press, 1974), 2
2 Ibid.
1
2
that said he wouldn't be back — he had found someone younger, prettier and smarter, Her 
husband called her later that night to let her know he had paid the apartment rent through 
the end of the week, but after that she would have to leave or come up with the rent herself 
because he would no longer be supporting her. Having unilaterally decided to dissolve their 
marriage under cover of the California no-fault divorce law. Bill left Barbara a single parent 
o f two young daughters living on a secretary's wage. In the following years, Bill 
consistently earned over $50,000 annually and managed to send his $200 a month child 
support about eight months out o f ten; he has not seen or called his daughters since he left.
These two cases serve to illustrate the extremes of the effects of divorce law in 
twentieth century America. Eva McNulty's case was heard in 1956, and the court’s decision 
was never overturned.3 Barbara Welch's case occurred in California in 1973 shortly after 
that state passed its sweeping, no-fault divorce law reform.
The voice of the communitarians is one of many in today's society calling for a return 
to morality. While this call is ill defined in many quarters, for the communitarians it means 
starting at home, in the family, and in particular with children. The communitarian platform 
published in November of 1991 asserts that "bringing children into the world entails a 
moral responsibility to provide, not only material necessities, but also moral education and 
character formation."4 They lay the responsibility for the moral fiber of society squarely on 
parents saying that "moral education is not a task that can be delegated," that fathers and
3 Ibid.
4 "The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities," The 
Rrepnnrivp rnm m im ty Winter TQQT/T 992: 7.
3
mothers who are too consumed by "making it" cannot "discharge their most elementary 
duty to their children and fellow citizens."5
In particular, the communitarians stress that families headed by single parents are 
most likely to fall short of their duties to their children and for this reason divorce laws 
should be modified. Specifically, the communitarians argue for modifying the economic 
aspects o f divorce laws to protect children from bearing the brunt of the dissolution of 
marriages that leave the primary caretakers financially unable to provide adequate economic 
support for the children in their care.
And the communitarians are not alone in this consensus — civic, spiritual, academic 
and government leaders in many states have joined forces in an attempt to reverse or at least 
mitigate the effects of no-fault divorce policies through family law and divorce policy 
reform. Many states such as Iowa, Michigan, Colorado and Pennsylvania have family and 
marriage forums that are actively supporting and introducing legislation to change current 
divorce law. These groups also work diligently at the grass roots level, endeavoring to 
educate and persuade the general populace that no-fault divorces are not m the community's 
best interest.
This thesis proposes a means of changing current divorce laws to help protect children 
of divorce while remaining true to our underlying cultural and political traditions, namely, a 
commitment to the pursuit of happiness and our long-standing reliance on individual rights, 
hi other words, we need a uniform divorce policy that protects the rights of children 
without totally denying the rights of unhappily married men and women to divorce.
5 Ibid., 7-8.
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Chapter Two of this thesis examines the cultural and political background of divorce 
law in America- This includes a brief history of American divorce law, some comparisons 
with the divorce laws of other Western cultures, and an investigation of the causes leading 
to the divorce policy reform that swept the nation in the 1970s. Chapter Three follows this 
theme with a discussion of how the no-fault reform was crafted and implemented, and an 
in-depth review of the unintended outcomes of that reform.
Chapter Four examines the dominant ethical and political theories of Western thought 
that have influenced the development of the American culture over the last two hundred 
years. Chapter Five then examines our political penchant for pursuing individual rights 
(sometimes at the expense of the communal good), and the connection between the Lockean 
theory of happiness, the inalienable (and culturally ingrained) American right of "pursuit o f 
happiness," and our current reluctance to back away from a divorce policy that is so clearly 
destructive to so many.
Chapter Six provides an analysis of the arguments for and against reforming no-fault 
divorce policy. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the most prominent 
alternatives currently promulgated for developing a new policy.
Chapter Seven concludes with an analysis of the failure of reform in the 1990s and a 
recommendation for divorce policy reform that will have a better chance of acceptance by 
the American public.
CHAPTER 2
DIVORCE IN AMERICA
Despite the recent media and political attention, divorce is not a new phenomenon 
in our society. Quite the contrary, as early as the 1630s the Puritans allowed couples to 
divorce in cases o f willful desertion or adultery. In addition, these early divorce laws 
allowed Americans to remarry — the Puritans held that a loveless union did no honor to 
God, and they allowed divorced husbands and wives to remarry hoping that a stronger 
union would result. Also, the Puritans treated divorce as a civil matter rather than an 
ecclesiastical one (as was the practice in Europe), and while obtaining a divorce may not 
have been easy nor socially acceptable, it was certainly more available than in other 
societies of the time.1
The American reliance on civil law for divorce cases was in all likelihood a result 
o f the resentment and resistance to the Church o f England’s conservative stand on divorce 
which, at the time, mirrored the Roman Catholic policy. In addition, the early Americans
1 Talbot, Margaret, "Love, American Style: What the Alarmists About Divorce 
Dont Get About Idealism," The New Republic, April 14,1997,32.
5
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saw the restrictive and unwieldy procedures for obtaining a divorce in England as
evidence o f the Crown's abuse of authority.2
For instance, in England divorce cases came before the ecclesiastical courts (or in
very rare circumstances were granted as a special act of Parliament), and were available
only to the wealthy. These divorces were rarely sought, more rarely granted, and did not
allow the divorced spouses to remarry — resulting instead in a divorce of "bed-and-board"
in which the husband and wife could live separately, but were, in essence, still married.3
This focus on the indissolubility o f marriage is understandable in light of how English
(and most other nations') marriages were contracted.
Until the 16 th century, marriage was seldom entered for the sake of love. In fact,
many marriages were arranged during the infancy or childhood of one or both o f the
marital partners as a means of increasing families’ property, wealth, loyalties and power,
and these ties and allegiances made marriages very stable. As Lawrence Stone put it,
There can be little doubt that the institutional marriage, in the arrangement 
o f which parents and "friends" played a large part and financial 
considerations loomed large, tended to create marital stability. This was 
because the ties that bound the spouses together were more numerous and
2 Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1997), 13.
3 Himmelfarb, Gertrude, The De-Moralization of Society, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1995), 111. It wasn't until the Divorce Act o f 1857 that divorces m England were 
removed from the ecclesiastical courts and made a civil action (thus making divorce more 
available to the lower, less wealthy classes). Interestingly, recent studies indicate that in 
the first ten years of the law's enactment, slightly over 50 percent of petitioners were 
women — this coincides with current statistics on American divorces that show that more 
women than men file for divorce today.
more permanent than those ephemeral psychosomatic experiences,
romantic love and sexual passion.4
The Protestant Reformation, however, sought to create a society that was run by 
puritanical, biblical norms.5 In 1712, the theologian Benjamin Wadsworth wrote in his 
treatise, The Well-Ordered Family, that love is a mutual duty of both husband and wife, 
and that the husband who is not kind and loving "then shames his profession of 
Christianity, he breaks the divine law, he dishonours God and himself, too." Of unloving, 
unkind wives, Wadsworth wrote "she not only affronts her Husband, but also God, her 
Maker, Lawgiver and Judge."6
Our Puritan Heritage
Promoting this norm, Protestantism created a new pattern of family life, "making 
marriage a more ethical and personal matter and recognizing a mutual right of divorce," 
while still enforcing the patriarchal ideal passed down from medieval times.7 The Puritan 
ideal was also one of social harmony, and they believed that functional families were 
particularly crucial to that harmonious society. Truly troubled marriages that ended in 
desertion, or in one or the other spouse bringing a marital complaint before the minister
4 Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England: 1500 - 1800, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 148.
5 Donald Kagan , Steven Ozment, and Frank M. Turner, The Western Heritage, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), 393.
6 Benjamin Wadsworth, The Wed-Ordered Family, quoted in Talbot, 32.
7 Kagan, 393.
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or magistrate, disrupted this ideal. So, while marriage as a life long agreement was still 
strenuously promoted, the Puritan leaders also allowed for divorce proceedings in 
extreme cases of disruptive marriages. The hope was that by providing for divorce in 
remedial cases, the family as an institution would be protected.8 These puritanical beliefs 
are influential in the American predisposition to the right to divorce.
All of the colonies, however, were not in accord with the Puritans on the matter of 
divorce. As might be expected, divorce laws and practices varied from colony to colony, 
as well as regionally.9 The New England colonies led the way in not only the most 
lenient laws, but also in number of divorces granted. The New England colonies had well 
established laws setting forth grounds for divorce (such as female adultery, desertion, 
bigamy, abuse or cruelty, and impotence), for division of property and alimony upon 
granting a divorce; and for determining whether or not divorcees could remarry.10
The middle colonies (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware), on the 
other hand, allowed divorce but instituted few formal procedures and laws in this regard. 
In part this was due to a lessening of the puritanical influences felt in the New England 
colonies, but more directly, it was a result of England's interference in the fashioning, 
implementation and execution of laws in the colonies. Not only did England strike down
8 Glenda Riley, Divorce: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 9-11.
9 Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 143.
10 See Riley, 25-29 and Phillips, 144-147.
9
some o f the colonies* bills o f divorce, but the English government actually overturned 
several divorces."
For these reasons, few divorces were granted in the middle colonies, and most of 
the cases that are recorded were presided over by governors or legislatures, and were 
granted only for grounds such as adultery and desertion. The southern colonies (Virginia, 
Maryland, North and South Carolina) were even more conservative — no divorces were 
granted before the American Revolution.12
This disparity between divorce practices in the northern and southern colonies 
may have had two basic causes. First, the southern colonies were established primarily 
by colonists who followed the Anglican faith with its strong prohibition o f divorce 
(Henry VIII notwithstanding). Unlike the Puritans, the southern colonists followed the 
English practice of divorce of bed and board only; however, they followed the American 
practice of keeping divorce a civil rather than an ecclesiastical matter.13
Moreover, the unavailability of divorce did not mean, southern marriages were 
happy. Formal and informal separations were widespread; spouses "divorced" each other 
by publicly repudiating one another's debts and announcing informal separations, and 
families with property tried to protect their daughters financially by negotiating pre­
marital contracts for them in case their daughters' marriages faded.14
" Phillips, 148-153.
12 Riley, 25-29.
13 Phillips, 143.
14 Riley, 27-28.
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The second reason for the difference in divorce laws between the southern and
northern colonies may lie in the importance each placed on the family as a source of
social stability. William O'Neill has suggested that family patterns may have played a
significant role in this disparity. He proposes that
when families are large and loose, arouse few expectations, and 
make few demands, there is no need for divorce. But when families 
become the centre of social organization, their intimacy can become 
suffocating, their demands unbearable, and their expectations too 
high to become easily realizable. Divorce then becomes the safety
valve that makes the system workable. Divorce is, therefore, not
an anomaly or a flaw in the system, but an essential feature of it.15
The flaw with this premise, as Roderick Phillips observes, is that divorces were not
granted during colonial times due to unfulfilled expectations or mutual discontent:
incompatibility or irreconcilable differences were not held as grounds for divorce.
Phillips agrees, however, that there is enough evidence to suggest that family
patterns did have some influence on the issue of divorce policy. The southern colonies,
for instance, held an informal attitude toward families, where common law marriages
occurred frequently, and where new settlements were established first by single men
venturing into new territory with no families at all. In the northern colonies, by contrast,
the puritanical and Protestant Reformation influences put a high value on family
cohesiveness as the basis of social and political order — families lived in very close
quarters where almost "all important daytime activities were sustained in one room, by
15 William L. O'Neill, Divorce in the Progressive Era (New York, 1963), 6-7 
quoted in Phillips, 144.
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groups comprising six, eight, ten, and even a dozen persons."16 In addition, northern 
settlements were mostly comprised o f married couples, to the extent that solitary living 
was sometimes forbidden.17
From this short overview, it is obvious that the colonial Puritans' religious 
convictions influenced not only American divorce law, but also contributed to one of the 
most important cultural and social changes in Western society: removing divorce from 
religious to secular jurisdiction is one o f the major political changes of the time and 
reflects an overall change in political theory throughout the Western civilization.
Revolutionary America
As Whitehead points out, revolutionary America was philosophically preoccupied 
with the right to form and disband unions, and the issue of divorce politically and socially 
fit within this preoccupation. Consequently, both family and political relationships were 
central to the republican thinking of the day. As evidence of this, the only two magazines 
printed in 1774 and 1775 (Robert Aitken's Pennsylvania Magazine and Isaiah Thomas's 
Royal American Magazine) ran frequent articles on the subject o f marriage and divorce.18
Thomas Paine (who had left an unhappy marriage in England) was both editor and
16 John Demos, "Demography and Psychology in the Historical Study o f Family- 
Life: A Personal Report," in Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (eds.), Household and 
Family in Past Time (Cambridge, 1972), 563 as quoted by Phillips, 145.
17 Phillips, 145.
18 Whitehead, 15.
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frequent contributor to the Pennsylvania Magazine. In his article "Reflections on 
Unhappy Marriages" published in 1775, Paine argued against marriages based on cold 
calculation, advantage, greed or lust and compared these marriages to prostitution. He 
also argued that these marriages belonged to the Old World, and that republican 
marriages should be unions of the heart, freely chosen by the partners involved and free 
of other interests and claims.19 The republican ideal o f freedom of choice, however, 
extended a type of conditionality to marriage: if true marriage was based on mutual love 
and affection, then the marriage could be disbanded when that love grew cold or 
tyrannical.20 In fact, Thomas Paine recommended quite plainly that "we instantly dissolve 
the band."21
Even more strongly, the pamphlet An Essay on Marriage, or the Lawfulness of 
Divorce published five years after the Revolutionary War argued that freedom to divorce 
was actually an expression o f republican liberty. The writer o f the pamphlet wrote that 
America should extend the spirit o f love o f liberty to allow divorce for people "united 
together in the worst bondage.”22
19 Thomas Paine, "Reflections on Unhappy Marriages," in Complete Writings of 
Thomas Paine, ed. Philip S. Foner, 2 vols. (New York: Citadel Press, 1945), vol. 2,1119, 
quoted in Whitehead, 15.
20 Whitehead, 15.
21 Paine, 11120 quoted in Whitehead, 15.
“ Whitehead, 15.
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Although, divorce rates at the end o f the 1700s varied somewhat by region, 
divorce laws were liberalized and statistics show a sharp increase in the numbers o f 
divorces in the last decade of the century.23 Nonetheless, marriage breakdown before the 
nineteenth century remained extremely rare: economic success depended on conjugal 
cooperation, alternatives to marriage were few, and social and religious institutions 
created enormous pressure on couples to remain married.24
For the most part, the new states enacted legislation at the end of the 
Revolutionary War similar to or more liberal than the divorce laws in place during the 
colonial period. Additionally, the more conservative southern states began to allow 
divorce relying on the legislative system o f divorce proceedings in an effort to control 
and monitor the rate of divorce. More importantly, however, the middle and northern 
states began a shift to judicial divorce (usually by petition to the highest level of state 
courts) as opposed to the colonial system of legislative divorces (granted by legislative 
act).25
This geographic spread o f the availability of divorce and the shift from legislative 
to judicial control of divorce proceedings had an enormous impact on the divorce rates o f
23 Ibid., 17.
24 See Phillips, Chapter 10, "The Social Context o f Marriage Breakdown." 
Phillips notes that while divorce, separation and desertion were harder for women, men 
also found single or divorced life difficult. Phillips also suggests that the extremely low 
rate of marital breakdown is a reflection of the low and flexible expectations of marriage: 
when expectation is low, tolerance can be correspondingly high for a wide range o f 
behavior and conditions that might not be tolerated otherwise.
25 Phillips, 154-158.
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the nineteenth century: divorce rates in the United States would soon surpass those of all 
other Western nations.
Divorce In The 1800s 
The nineteenth century saw the continued liberalization of divorce policies and a 
progressive expansion of permissible grounds for divorce. Paradoxically, we also see 
strong attempts to keep divorce at a minimum through statutory and judicial control. 
This parallels our continuing social and cultural commitment to the institution of 
marriage while recognizing the unacceptability of binding couples in perpetual 
unhappiness if the marriage goes awry.
Between 1800 and 1850, the northeastern states (with the exception of New York) 
continued to expand the grounds for divorce to include offenses such as extreme cruelty, 
a wife's insanity (but not a husband's), imprisonment for a felony, and a spouse's 
desertion to join a religious sect that did not believe in sexual relationships.26 In addition, 
the northeastern states continued the effort o f disengaging divorce proceedings from 
legislative control and codifying the resultant judiciary procedures. New York, however,
26 The latter ground for divorce was in response to the Shaker movement which 
held all sexual relations were against divine law. Since celibacy was required o f its 
members, a  spouse who joined without his or her partner's agreement was technically 
guilty o f desertion. The Shaker communities tried to guard against this by only accepting 
as members couples in agreement on the issue. Nonetheless, some spouses managed to 
join without then mates' consent, and states with Shaker communities began to allow 
divorce in these cases. (See Phillips, 441 and Riley, 67-68.)
15
steadfastly continued to grant divorce by legislative act alone with, adultery as the sole 
ground for divorce.27
At the turn of the century, the southern states (except for South Carolina) began 
granting legislative divorces and then gradually moved away from legislative to judicial 
divorce proceedings in most states. In general, the southern states enacted laws with 
fewer grounds available for obtaining divorce than the northern states had, but by 1860 
all the states that would form the Confederacy (with the exception of South. Carolina) had 
adopted policies establishing at a minimum adultery, desertion and cruelty as grounds for 
divorce. Taking into consideration that the southern colonies previously had not allowed 
any form of divorce, this seemingly slower progress to liberalize divorce laws is still 
comparable to the more progressive trend of the northern states.28
The West and Midwest, on the other hand, provide a sharp contrast to southern 
conservatism. Phillips argues that the liberalism of the West and Midwest is in part due 
to the fact that these states entered the Union when divorce laws were already being 
liberalized in other states (as opposed to having started with more conservative laws). 
The specific grounds for divorce were not significantly different in the western states, but 
the legislatures were frequently given great latitude in determining cases at then: own 
discretion beyond the grounds specified by law. For instance, the 1824 law passed in 
Indiana allowed for divorce in any case the court in its discretion found just and 
reasonable.
27 Phillips, 444.
28 Ibid., 445-451.
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Along with this judiciary discretion, the West and Midwest frequently had lenient 
residency requirements: in Indiana the person filing suit had only to prove residency at 
the time of filing the suit; Utah went as far as to allow anyone to file who could show he 
or she was a resident or wished to become one! While there was a wide variety of 
differences in the divorce policies of the western and midwestem states, the broad 
discretionary powers accorded the courts allowed for rapid liberalization of laws and even 
encouraged the lessening of severity o f cause in justifying a divorce.29
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, there had been those who voiced 
their concern over liberalizing divorce laws, but a full scale reaction against divorce was 
not mounted until after the Civil War. Divorce rates began rising steadily after 1850 with 
a sharp increase from 1865 through the end of the century. This rise in divorce rates set 
off alarm bells for conservatives who equated the dissolution of marriage with the 
downfall of society.
In the 1850s, conservative social and political commentators including Horace 
Greeley, then editor of the New York Tribune, began expressing concern over the issue of 
divorce. Greeley in particular was a vocal opponent of any form of divorce and used the 
Tribune as a pulpit for his arguments.
While debate on divorce became inconsequential during the Civil War, the end. of 
the war fanned the flames of the renewed debate in the late 1860s and 1870s. As 
statistics show, divorce rates always rise immediately after a war, and the War Between 
the States was no exception. As divorce rates continued to rise, the issue o f divorce
29 Ibid., 451-454.
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became a major part of the social discussion again — in fact, divorce became "one of the 
first aspects of what we call the Revolution in Morals to become a matter of public 
controversy."30
The fight against divorce was carried on through the work of social scientists, 
organized religion, and social and political commentators — men such as Theodore 
Woolsey, retired president of Yale University, attorney and Doctor o f Divinity. The 
pressure created by Woolsey and other clergymen lobbying for divorce reform led to the 
formation of the New England Divorce Reform League in 1881, which became the 
National Divorce Reform League in 1885, and the National League for Protection of the 
Family in 1897, and was the first organized political opposition to rising divorce rates in 
the United States.31
The debate in the 1880s and 1890s centered on familiar themes to those of us 
living in the year 2000: the destruction of the family unit that is the foundation of our 
society, the welfare of children of divorce, the concern o f organized Christian religions 
that view divorce as socially destructive and scripturally immoral, and women's rights 
advocates concerned that men hold the power to determine and enforce divorce laws that 
so greatly affect the lives of women.32
30 O' Neill, vii quoted in Phillips, 461.
31 Phillips, 456-461.
32 Riley, 108-118.
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Divorce In the Twentieth Century
By the beginning of the twentieth century, all states except New York and South 
Carolina had established liberalized legal processes for divorce available to virtually all 
social strata and had thus set the stage for what Whitehead calls the divorce culture o f the 
later 1900s. In sum, the twentieth century turned its back on hundreds of years o f western 
tradition: divorce, which had always been marginalized, penalized, and treated as a 
deviant social phenomenon, became accepted, expected (statistically at least), and an 
integral part of the pattern o f American familial and cultural lives.
From 1900 to 1920, there were actually few significant changes to the laws 
already enacted by the 1890s. This is undoubtedly due in part to the outbreak of World 
War I. The war did, however, have a now predictable effect on divorce rates: the number 
of divorces rose dramatically immediately following the war (from 75,000 divorces in 
1910 to over 155,000 in 1920).33
Phillips argues that there are several possible explanations for the increase. First, 
the lengthy enforced separation of spouses weakened many marriages. Second, spouses 
grew apart because their wartime experiences were so different. Men, for example, 
experienced not only the horrors o f war, but also new places and cultures;34 women
33 Phillips, 517. Many of these divorces were undoubtedly sought by couples who 
had married hastily at the outset of the war, but that does not adequately explain such a 
dramatic increase in the divorce rate.
34 The popular culture of the time suggests an awareness of the idea that these new 
experiences might (or did) create new problems. For example, in the World War I song 
How You Gonna Keep 'Em Down on the Farm? by Arthur Fields part o f the lyrics read, 
"How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm, after they've seen Paree?”
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worked outside the home and gained a new sense of independence. Third, Phillips 
suggests that wartime adultery (possibly a result o f the first two conditions) accounted for 
many of the post-war divorces.3S
The post-war years established a new level o f acceptance of divorce, and while 
divorce rates dropped slightly in 1921 and 1922, they steadily increased from 1922 until 
1930.36 Migratory divorce was common for citizens who could not easily obtain a 
divorce in their own states — sometimes this meant traveling to France, the Virgin 
Islands, Cuba or Mexico, but more often it meant a less exotic trip to Nevada. In fact, the 
1920s became the decade o f a virtual divorce trade war between states such as Idaho, 
Nevada, Arkansas and Indiana.
These states vied for out-of-state clients by lowering residency requirements and 
making inexpensive lodging available. A city where the trade could boom had "a good 
railway station, was centrally located, had good shopping and recreational facilities, and 
an eager group of lawyers who courted the divorce trade."37 The competition, however, 
was not an endeavor to see who could enact the most liberalized residency laws, but more 
a case of economic expediency: the trade from out-of-state clients provided a lucrative
3S Phillips, 519-522.
35 Constance Ahrons, The Good Divorce (Harper Collins Publishers, New York,
1994), 28.
37 Ibid.
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income for theses states — an income that would become even more attractive, during the 
depression years of the 1930s.38
After the stock market crash in October, 1929, the divorce rates declined in the 
United States for the fist time in ten years. From 1930 to 1933, divorce rates fell by 
twenty percent compared to the rate in 1929. This drop in divorces can be attributed to 
factors influenced by economics: women's employment opportunities decreased, thereby 
making divorce less feasible for them; couples could not afford to get married and 
marriages declined by thirteen percent during this time; and couples who had separated 
did not seek divorce because they could not afford to remarry (making a divorce 
unnecessary). By 1934, however, divorce rates began to rise again and by 1936 surpassed 
the pre-Depression rate.39
The onset of World War H had little effect on the divorce rate, but the post-war 
years saw an unprecedented increase. Most likely, the same factors that caused the 
increase in divorces after World War 1 were at work after World War H. Also, as in the 
1920s after World War I, divorce rates declined somewhat and stabilized in the 1950s. 
Unlike the 1920s, however, the decade from 1950 to I960 saw very little increase in the 
divorce rate for the first time in nearly a century.
The stability of divorce rates in the 1950s may be explained by several social, 
economic and political factors. Post-war society entered a period o f social conservatism. 
Families and marriage were held in higher esteem by society probably in reaction to the
38 Phillips, 530-533.
39 Ibid., 553-555.
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exigencies o f the war following close on the heels o f the Depression. Also, the nation
enjoyed a period of great prosperity and economic boom. Finally, legislation changed so
little, that there was not even the usual rise in rates due to liberalization o f laws.40
Stephanie Coontz suggests that the strong pro-family sentiment and the great
economic improvement combined to make a powerful (if short-lived) cultural shift
Not only was the 1950s family a new invention, it was also a historical 
fluke, based on a unique and temporary conjuncture of economic, social, 
and political factors. During the war, Americans had saved at a rate more 
than three times higher than that in the decades before or since. Their 
buying power was further enhanced by America’s extraordinary 
competitive advantage at the end o f the war, when every other industrial 
power was devastated by the experience.41
As evidence that these factors worked in concert, she cites the purchases o f appliances
and household furnishings that rose by two hundred and forty percent following World
War II, and the fact that nearly the entire increase in the gross national product in the
mid-1950s was attributable to residential building and consumer durable goods.42
In addition, Coontz suggests that emotionally, people were putting "their mouths
where their money was” — the majority o f people responding to a 1955 marriage study
said they gave up "nothing" in being married, and less than ten percent believed that
40 Ibid., 555-561.
41 Stephanie Coontz, The Wav We Never were: American Families and the 
Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1992), 28.
42 Ibid.
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single persons could be happy. Coontz quotes a popular advice book as stating, "The 
family is the center o f your living. If it isn't, you've gone far astray."43
This advice is indicative o f the mood of the 1950s. Tremendous social pressure 
was brought to bear on both men and women to live by this precept A pseudo-Victorian 
revival of separate spheres occurred: the real difference being that Victorian women were 
responsible for the moral realm of the home, while their 1950s counterparts were 
responsible for what amounted to personal service. Victorian women with even modest 
means left housework to servants — 1950s housewives regardless o f their means were 
expected to cook, clean and be cheerfully attentive to their husbands’ needs.44
Men also were pressured into new roles: men belonged married and at home (not 
single, and certainly not out with the guys); they were supposed to control the behavior 
and attitudes of their families; and frequently, promotions depended on the suitability o f a 
man's marriage, i.e., the suitability of his wife. Coontz points out that all of this laid the 
groundwork for tremendous familial conflict that was internalized due to the perceived 
lack of divorce as an option and was most likely a major factor in the tremendous rise in 
divorce rates in the late 1960s.45
Beginning in 1959, the divorce rate began climbing again, and by 1968, the rate 
was increasing by up to twelve percent a year. By 1974, the rate o f increase per year
43 Ibid., 25.
44 Coontz uses as an example the public relations releases for Joan Crawford 
showing the star mopping her own floors.
45 Ibid., 27-29.
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slowed, but it was not until 1982 that the divorce rate decreased slightly,46 The reasons 
for the increase are consistent with previous rises in the divorce rate: women's economic 
independence, cultural attitudes in the form o f marital expectations, and legal reform.
The first two apply to the sharp increases from 1960 to 1968. The depression and 
the war profoundly affected marital expectations after World War EL It has been argued 
that through the years of economic deprivation, Americans internalized a strong 
commitment to family combined with low material expectations — many of them had 
quite likely despaired of ever marrying. These people subscribed to (and perhaps created) 
the cultural shift with its focus on marriage and family — they regarded their marriages as 
something to protect and maintain.
During the 1950s, however, women paradoxically began entering the work force 
in unprecedented numbers. Coontz argues that during this period of reasserted 
domesticity for wives, women returned to work in response to growing economic factors. 
As demand for labor outstripped supply, and with so many men remaining in military 
service, barriers to women workers fell and wages paid to women rose. By I960, forty 
percent o f all women worked — and increasingly these women stated that they worked for 
reasons o f self-esteem as well as economic need.47
Phillips argues that throughout western history, women's employment is one of 
the most significant factors in the rise of divorce rates. He suggests this is so because 
women's employment affects several marital conditions. It not only provides an
46 Phillips, 560.
47 Coontz, 160-161.
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economic avenue of escape for women in marriages that have broken down, but it also 
may facilitate divorce for men who financially could not afford two households. 
Additionally, employment outside the home may contribute to the actual breakdown o f a 
marriage that otherwise might survive. Women who work, for the most part, continue to 
bear all or nearly all of the burden o f maintaining their homes which creates even more 
stress that can contribute significantly to marital discord. Phillips further points out that 
by I960, many women were working to pay for the extras or luxuries of life — not just for 
the necessities such as food and shelter,48 and Coontz reminds us that the late 1950s set 
the scene for the runaway indebtedness of the 1970s and 1980s — it was the beginning of 
the era o f the two-wage family.49
This change in material expectations in the marriage has paralleled a 
corresponding rise in the importance of affection in the marriage -- an increasing focus on 
the couple’s emotional relationship. Evidence of this can be found in the ever mounting 
numbers of self-help books (for example, Men Are from Mars and Women Are from 
Venus) stressing communication, understanding each other's needs and improving sexual 
relations within the marriage. Phillips argues that these are concerns that in the past were 
associated with pre- or extra-marital affairs, and that the traditionally held expectation of 
a "slide from intense passion to comfortable companionship after the initial years of
48 Phillips, 621-622.
49 Coontz, 37-38.
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married life"50 has become less than acceptable and possibly contributes to the stresses 
that can lead to marital breakdown.
After 1968, however, the tremendous rise in divorce rates can also be correlated 
with the reform in divorce law. It is apparent that during the 1960s, Americans changed 
their attitudes about divorce -  in fact, surveys show that the attitude toward liberalizing 
divorce occurred faster than the divorce law reform. This attitudinal change appears to 
have occurred primarily between 1968 and 1974 — coincidental with sweeping divorce 
policy reforms and the greatest phase of increase in the divorce rate.51
50 Phillips, 623.
51 Phillips, 623-627.
CHAPTER 3
NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Until the 1970s, traditional marriages in the United States and other western 
cultures were viewed as contracts wherein both husbands and wives had legal obligations 
that were specified in various forms of law. These laws reinforced the responsibilities o f 
both parties, rewarding those who fulfilled their marital obligations and punishing 
spouses who did not.1
Despite the gradual liberalization o f divorce laws, the traditional fault-based 
divorce law, which prevailed in the United States until California's landmark reform in 
1969, sought to maintain this traditional family relationship by making it difficult for 
spouses to obtain a divorce. This meant that traditional western law reinforced and 
helped define the roles and responsibilities o f a traditional legal marriage. In her book 
The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for 
Women and Children in America, Lenore J. Weitzman points out that these roles and 
responsibilities were gender-based in a patriarchal family structure that had a moral 
framework and presumed a lifelong commitment to the marital partnership.
1 Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and 
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1985), I.
26
27
To obtain a divorce under traditional divorce law it was rarely enough to 
demonstrate that the marriage was dead — that both parties agreed to irreconcilable 
differences or simply had made a mistake and agreed that they wanted out o f the 
marriage. Under traditional law, spouses had to establish that one or the other o f them 
was solely responsible for the death of the marriage. In addition, grounds for divorce 
were limited to a few kinds of marital fault, usually adultery, cruelty, drunkenness or 
desertion. Proponents of traditional divorce law saw these obstacles to divorce as 
representing society's "valid interest in promoting family stability, pointing to statistics 
correlating broken homes with higher crime rates and increased welfare payments, as well 
as less tangible moral values."2
In any event, traditional divorce laws laid a moral framework o f guilt or 
innocence; divorce was a means for the innocent to obtain redress from the guilty. In 
fact, many states carried this to the extent that unless the party seeking the divorce was 
entirely blameless or innocent, neither party would be granted the divorce. Presumably, 
this approach precluded the court from rewarding anyone with "dirty hands."3
Consequently, financial awards at the dissolution o f a marriage were also linked 
to innocence or guilt; in other words, alimony was awarded to an innocent spouse as a 
"judgement against the guilty spouse."4 And because traditional divorce laws reinforced 
the traditional roles o f marriage, women stayed home and raised children, and men
2 Wheeler, 2-8.
3 Ibid., 10.
4 Ibid., 12.
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supported them -- even in divorce. This meant that men usually paid alimony subsequent 
to a divorce, and women almost always were awarded custody of the children.
Weitzman concludes that traditional divorce law reinforced the traditional 
marriage through reward and punishment. Wives who committed adultery, cruelty or 
desertion would be denied alimony; husbands would be punished through awards of 
property, alimony and child support to the wife. Justice in this system was the 
"assurance that the marriage contract would be honored."5
Unfortunately, this system thrust an already unpleasant situation into an 
inescapably adversarial confrontation as well as often inducing flagrant perjury so that 
someone could be judged guilty and someone innocent. In his book No-Fault Divorce. 
Michael Wheeler quotes Monrad Paulsen of the University of Virginia Law School, "The 
necessity of proving a ground o f divorce such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion leads to 
the most flagrant collusion and outright fraud on part o f divorce seeking couples."6 This 
policy often resulted in one or both parties committing perjury and, as we shall see, led in 
part to the establishment o f no-fault divorce laws.
The 1960s heralded an era of liberalizing changes in Western society and 
especially the United States. This was the decade of the civil rights movement; the war in 
Vietnam and its tremendous opposition from the youth of America; the beginning of a 
strong feminist movement that would challenge the social and political dominance of 
men in the 1970s; liberalized attitudes toward sex and birth control; and even the Roman 
Catholic Church (a bastion o f staid traditions) gave way to the progressive forces of
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society with, sweeping changes as a result of the 21st Ecumenical Council (Vatican II). In 
short, authorities, governments and institutions responded to the social pressure by 
liberalizing many policies — including divorce laws.
According to Roderick Phillips, Western society in the 1960s reevaluated not only 
divorce laws, but the institution of marriage itself. He argues that the introduction o f no­
fault divorce laws was the "result of a long debate about the character o f marriage and the 
functions of marriage law.” He further argues that the social scientific approach to marriage 
and divorce shifted the emphasis from individual responsibility for success or failure of a 
marriage to an analysis o f "causal or predisposing conditions in society at large."7 This 
cultural shift was not endemic to the United States alone and bears out Philips’ contention 
that marriage itself has not changed so much as the context of marriage has. As Table 3.1 
shows, most western nations made overhauling changes to their long-standing divorce 
policies between 1960 and 1980.
While Table 1 shows only the dates for changes in California and New York in 
the United States, all fifty states adopted reform at varying times from 1967 (New York) 
to 1985 (South Dakota).® The California reform, however, was the first true no-fault 
reform in the United States, and a discussion of its adoption and the consequences of its 
implementation can serve as a good example o f the divorce reform movement o f the 
1960s and 1970s.
7 Phillips, 565-566. 
* Ibid., 562.
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Table 1 -- Divorce Law Reform, 1960-1981
®^sea^oBreasMioiE
1961/1976 West Germany Major reform/complete revision
1963/1980 New Zealand Complete revisions
1967 New York State Complete revision
1968 Canada First federal divorce law
1969 England and Wales Complete revision
1969 Denmark Major reform
1969 Finland Major reform
1969 Norway Major reform
1969 California Complete revision
1970 Italy Divorce legalized
1971 Netherlands Complete revision
1983 Sweden Complete revision
1974 Belgium Major reform
1975 Australia Complete revision
1975 France Complete revision
1975 Italy Major reform
1976 Scotland Complete revision
1977 Portugal Complete revision
1978 Austria Major reform
Source: Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder A History of Divorce in Western Society 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 566.
31
The California Initiative
When California passed its divorce reform law in 1969, the United States became 
the first nation in the Western world to support unilateral, no-fault divorces. The divorce 
law reform that started in California actually began as an effort to reduce the adversarial 
nature o f divorce proceedings inherent in a one-party-is-guilty system and to eliminate 
the hypocrisy and outright perjury required o f couples who lied under oath in order to 
find one party guilty and the other innocent.9 As evidenced by the fact that every other 
state in the Union followed suit by adopting no-fault divorce laws within 15 years, 
California's concerns were probably representative o f many o f the concerns felt by 
society at large -  further bearing out Phillips’ arguments for a cultural shift in our views 
on marriage and divorce. In fact within four years o f the California reform, thirty-six 
states had adopted no-fault divorce laws. Ironically, South Dakota was the last state to 
adopt no-fault divorce laws in 1985 — its frontier divorce mill days notwithstanding.10
The most troublesome aspects of the traditional fault-based divorce laws were: I) 
the adversarial environment, 2) child custody, 3) awards of child support, and 4) awards 
o f alimony and the division of property." In themselves, however, these problems were 
not enough to trigger what can loosely be termed the divorce movement. Instead, the
9 Wheeler, 14- 20. Ostensibly, Governor Brown appointed his Commissiott on the 
Family to revise the divorce laws in California to help stem the rising divorce rate, but 
clearly, the emphasis from the legislature was to eliminate the hypocrisy and perjury. This 
is most evident in the legislature ignoring the recommendations of the commission to 
institute family and marital counseling provisions as part of the reform adopted in 1970.
10 Herbert Jacob, "Women and Divorce Reform," in Women. Politics, and Change, 
(The Russell Sage Foundation, 1990), 483.
u Ibid.
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four major themes that set the reform in California in motion were: 1) the high divorce 
rates, 2) the adversarial process, 3) the need to recognize the inevitability o f divorce, and 
4) the strong reaction o f divorced men who charged that "the divorce law and its 
practitioners were in league with divorced wives to suck the blood, not to mention the 
money, o f former husbands."12
It is interesting to note that the instrumental call for change in California divorce 
law was made by then-Govemor Edmund Brown. Governor Brown appointed the 
Governor's Commission on the Family which was a bipartisan group of professionals 
(lawyers, judges, law professors, politicians and others).13 Governor Brown appointed 
the commission to proceed in a "concentrated assault on the high incidence of divorce 
and its tragic consequences” in an attempt to right the social and economic ills of divorce, 
namely juvenile delinquency, crime, alcoholism, and welfare dependency.14
Even after the California example, divorce policy reform in the rest of the states 
occurred with no structured or self-conscious policy reform movement. That is not to 
say, however, that the reform happened void of interest group participation. According 
to Herbert Jacob in his essay "Women and Divorce Reform" published in Women. 
Politics, and Change, the most active groups were lawyers, men's rights groups, and the 
Catholic Church.IS
a Weitzman, 16-17.
13 Wheeler, 19.
14 Weitzman, 18.
15 Jacob, 495.
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Lawyers
Divorce reform, legislation proposals were often initiated by individual lawyers or 
the organized bar, and most legislatures asked the bar in their states for opinions on the 
proposed legislation. Adding to their expertise in family law and access to legislatures, 
many lawyers also served in state legislatures, frequently monopolizing positions on 
judiciary committees. All these circumstances put together made (and make) lawyers a 
very influential group as states considered divorce reform.16
Also, it should not go unnoticed that family lawyers have a vested economic 
interest in the divorce laws of their states. Jacob cites the fact that the 1980 revision of 
property division laws in the state o f New York was in the bar’s economic interest. The 
reform "spurred an enormous amount o f litigation that made divorce expensive for many 
clients and remunerative for many attorneys.”17
Wheeler holds a similarly jaundiced view of the motives and even of the ability of 
lawyers involved in reforming divorce laws. From the perspective of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, he quotes Robert Drinan, a previous editor o f Family Law Quarterly as 
writing:
Despite the basic unsuitability of America's present divorce procedure, 
borrowed from the ecclesiastical courts, little if any imagination has been 
exercised in the creation of a better process. The fact is that the American bench 
and bar have never really been interested in the law o f domestic relations. 
Lawyers have tended to avoid divorce cases and have allowed a "divorce bar" to 
grow up in each metropolitan area. Similarly judges, at least until very recently, 
have acquiesced in the fact that the divorce court enjoys the least prestige of all 
the courts.18
16 Ibid., 496.
17 Ibid.
18 Wheeler, 134.
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Men's Rights Groups 
Although. lawyers and the bar had more influence with the state legislatures, men's 
rights groups were still very active from the beginning (as early as 1964 in California), 
and many testified before state legislatures though there is litde evidence that they were 
taken seriously before the 1980s.19 According to Wheeler, many o f the men's rights 
groups were considered "borderline kooks" which could have had a lot to do with their 
lack of influence. He recounts the story of Paul Hansen, the founder o f Fathers United 
for Equal Rights in Maryland, who received national publicity for picketing in front of a 
church attended by a Baltimore judge. Hansen wore nothing but a wooden barrel and his 
underwear and carried signs that read, "This Could Happen to You" and "Judge McGuire 
Repent." Hansen's group complained about alimony and the difficulty fathers had in 
obtaining custody of their children. His opinion of the system was, "The laws stink, the 
lawyers are putrid, and the judges are so slow to change.1'20 In addition to his theatrics, 
Hansen's unflattering language could not have endeared him or his cause to the influential 
lawyers, bar, judges and legislators o f Maryland.
Men's rights groups were very successful, however, in pressing for reform of the 
custody laws in the 1980s. These groups made intuitively appealing arguments for joint 
custody, and even though they were not nationally organized and had relatively low 
membership, they prevailed by focusing on the narrow issue of child custody.21
19 Jacob, 496.
20 Wheeler, 137.
21 Jacob, 496-497.
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The Roman Catholic Church 
Like men's rights groups, the Catholic Church achieved some success by narrowly 
focusing its interests, but unlike lawyers or men's rights groups, the church took a 
defensive rather than an offensive position. As a matter o f doctrine, all divorce is 
unacceptable to the Catholic Church, and it tried (in some cases successfully) to prevent 
divorce reforms from going through.
Because the Catholic Church is not really the monolithic entity that some suppose 
(at least not in the United States), and because the situations were different in each state, 
the church did not have a universal approach to divorce reform. Additionally, the church 
did not have easy access to legislatures as did lawyers and men's rights groups, but its 
influence was felt in states with large Catholic populations because many of the 
legislators in these states were Catholic. In addition, the church had lobbyists in state 
capitals, and it used the pulpit to deliver its message to parishioners.
In some states, however, the Catholic Church provided little resistance and in 
some cases actively supported divorce reform. In California, for example, the divorce 
laws were already so liberal that the church had no vested interest in maintaining a status 
quo. Additionally, the Governor's Commission was ostensibly charged with reforming 
the divorce laws to stem the high rate o f divorces, something the church viewed as a 
definite improvement. Consequently, there was at least tacit approval by the church of 
the divorce reform in that state.22
22 Wheeler, 146-150.
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So, while the church's principles may have seemed unshakable, it often made 
compromises and in the end had little effect on the eventual outcome o f divorce reform. 
The notable exceptions were the effects of its efforts in some of the states with large 
Catholic populations: New York never explicitly embraced no-fault, and no-fault reform 
came late to Wisconsin (1977), Pennsylvania (1980), and Illinois (1983).23
As a final observation, the women’s movement was conspicuously absent as a 
major contributor in the reform of divorce — especially since divorce reform occurred 
during a period o f intense feminist activity that reached a peak during the 1970s. 
According to Herbert Jacob, some of the apparent disinterest on the part of feminist 
groups can be attributed to the lack of influence of women in state legislatures. Jacob 
contends that while the feminist movement made a strong impression during this tune on 
the American public through the mass media, it did not penetrate to all levels of the 
policy making process and that "to claim a voice in divorce law change, feminists needed 
continuous representation in state capitals, a requirement which the fledgling  movement 
could not meet"24
The Unexpected Consequences
The divorce law reform that started out in California to contain the rising rate of 
divorce, and to "rid the divorce process of its anachronistic moral elements and reduce the 
acrimony, hostility, perjury and hypocrisy that pervaded the divorce process under the old
23 Jacob, 497.
24 Ibid., 490.
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law,"25 has had some unexpected outcomes over the last thirty years. These unexpected 
outcomes have been most evident in terms of the economic and moral consequences of 
post-no-fault divorce reform.
In discussing the results of the divorce law reform, it is helpful to look at the 
intended outcomes of the changes to the law. Lenore J. Weitzman used the comparisons 
in Table 2 to illustrate the differences between traditional and no-fault divorce laws.26 
The fault-based laws were restrictive, pro-marriage laws with specific grounds for 
divorce that were based on a moral framework, required one party to be at fault, and 
could not be sought unilaterally. The change to no-fault was almost a complete 
turnaround: no-fault laws facilitate divorce, require no grounds, have an administrative 
rather than a moral framework (no guilt or innocence), and can be undertaken by either 
party without the other’s consent. This “administrative” quality o f no-fault leads to 
gender-neutral decisions that leave both parties responsible for self-support, both eligible 
for custody, and both responsible for child support as opposed to the traditional role 
based decisions in which fathers pay alimony and child support, and wives get custody of 
the children.
This comparison helps us understand how the reform was perceived as equitable 
to all parties and advantageous in eliminating adversarial proceedings (as well as 
perjury). It also helps identify the areas that were impacted most by the changes: the 
economic status o f women and their children (gender-neutral responsibilities and 
financial awards based on equality) and the moral trap tacitly expressed in no-fault
25 Weitzman, 51.
26 Ibid., 40.
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proceedings whereby either spouse can leave at will and without cause — a situation that 
clearly undermines the individual responsibility and obligation incurred in a marriage.27
Economically, the issue is relatively clean cut — women and children have been 
most hurt by the equal division of property and by the lack of alimony or adequate child 
support perpetuated by the new laws. While the "equal" division of property suggests 
fairness and equity, it does not necessarily bring equal results to all parties in a divorce.
Table 2 — Summary o f Changes in Divorce Law
Traditional Divorce No-Fanlt Divorce
Restrictive Law -  pro-marriage Permissive Law -  facilitates divorce
Specific Grounds No Grounds
Moral Framework Administrative Framework
Fault No fault
Consent of Innocent Spouse Needed No Consent Needed
Gender-based Responsibilities Gender-neutral Responsibilities
Financial Awards Linked to Fault Financial Awards Based on Equality and 
Need
Adversarial Nonadversarial
Source: r.ennre J. Weityman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and 
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1985), 40.
As Weitzman points out, it can hardly be considered equitable to force the sale of 
the family assets (especially a home) so that the proceeds can be shared between the
27 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: American in Search o f a Public 
Philosophy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1996), 110.
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spouses when, the sale o f the assets means disruption and sometime dislocation m the 
lives of minor children. This method o f distributing property equally between the 
spouses belies the fact that the average family consists o f four people, not two. Under 
this rule, three people (the children and custodial parent, usually the wife) share one-half 
o f the property while the non-custodial parent (usually the husband) receives one-half all 
for him or herself.28
One way to avoid the sale o f the custodial home is for the custodial parent to 
"trade" an equally valuable asset for the home. The drawback to this solution is that 
many if  not most women who are custodial parents have no assets to trade — frequently, 
the family home is the only real asset a couple owns. Another alternative is for women to 
trade the amount o f child support or alimony the court might award them. Unfortunately, 
many women cannot live without the awarded support, so they are forced to sell the 
home.29
To compound the issue of equal treatment with unequal results, child support 
awards are low, and the awarded amount is rarely the same as the amount women actually 
receive.30 As Michael Sandel points out, no-fault divorce law fails to respect traditional 
roles and penalizes mothers and homemakers who have lived their married lives as 
"situated selves" — whose identities were constituted by their roles. These women have 
depended on their husbands for economic support and in return cared for children and
28 Weitzman, 104.
29 Ibid., 79-80.
30 Ibid., 265; also see Phillips, 628.
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home so that their husbands could pursue their careers. When the marriage breaks up, 
however, the husband still has his career while she has the care o f the children and the 
necessity of finding employment — many times without the benefit of marketable job 
skills.31
In practice, this means that women and children frequently experience a 
significant decrease in their standard o f living. Women typically are left with half o f the 
marital property (amounting to less than $10,000 on average), no alimony, child support 
they may never receive and custody o f the children.32 Weitzman's research shows that 
after only one year o f divorce, "Men experience a 42 percent improvement in their post­
divorce standard o f living while women experience a 73 percent decline." Weitzman 
points out that these data indicate a financial catastrophe for women who must then deal 
with "severe deprivation: every single expenditure that one takes for granted — clothing, 
food, housing, heat — must be cut to one-half or one-third of what one is accustomed 
to."33
Although Weitzman's study has been criticized as being too narrowly focused, 
and other studies have shown the economic consequences to be considerably less dire, the 
fact remains that children and their mothers suffer disastrous economic setbacks in 
divorce. For example, forty percent of all children eligible for child support have no legal
31 Sandel, 114.
32 Ibid.
33 Weitzman, 339.
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child support awarded to them,34 while those children who do receive child support do not 
fare that much better when one considers that the average annual child support obligation 
in the United States is $3,000.00. The median male salary, on the other hand, is $30,000 
annually35 — even after taxes, fathers of intact families have considerably more income 
than $3,000.00 per year to invest in their children's behalf.
In addition, studies such as those conducted by Judith Wallerstein and Sandra 
Blakeslee show that children of divorce are more at risk o f dropping out o f school, 
suffering emotional problems such as low self-esteem and alienation, and abusing alcohol 
and drugs.36 Although some studies report statistics that show a lesser degree o f negative 
impact on women and children of divorce, all of the findings indicate that in divorce, 
women and children are the losers.
While this economic "catastrophe" can be seen as a direct result of striving for 
equality under the no-fault divorce laws, it is perhaps even more a result of the new laws 
giving way to moral-blind grounds for divorce. Both the moral framework o f the old 
divorce laws and the gender-based responsibilities o f married partners protected women 
in the past from the kind of destitution that divorce brings to them and their children 
today.
34 Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 2.
35 "Money Income o f Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1990 
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 174 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991) quoted by Whitehead, 
155.
36 Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men. Women and 
Children a Decade After Divorce (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1989).
CHAPTER 4
SOME ETHICAL APPROACHES TO MARRIAGE,
CHILDREN AND DIVORCE
It is clear that in today's society, divorce has been transformed from a last resort 
into an acceptable, common response to marriage breakdown. This attitude toward 
marriage (reflected in no-fault divorce laws) is a direct result of the shifts in religious, 
ethical, political and socio-economic conditions that affect the family, marital 
expectations and our responses to marriage breakdown. This leads Phillips to argue that 
marriage has become less stable over time "not primarily because of changes in the 
emotional content of marriage but rather because the social context of marriage has been 
transformed."1
Furthermore, Sandel notes that the provisions for unilateral divorces, the concept of 
gender-neutral roles and the emphasis on self-sufficiency after divorce "reflect the liberal 
conception of persons as unencumbered selves independent o f their roles and unbound by 
moral ties they choose to rqect."2 This all leads one to conclude that the high rate of 
divorce and the lack of commitment to provide even minimal child support much less
1 Phillips, 640.
2 Sandel, 112.
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alimony may be linked at least in part to our cultural propensity to insist on individual rights 
without an accompanying sense of duty or responsibility.
This is a great cultural leap from the attitudes on divorce during most of our 200- 
year history. To better understand the process o f how our cultural attitudes changed so 
dramatically in such a relatively short span o f time, it is helpful to look at how the ethical 
theories affecting early America before the Revolutionary War shaped our political 
processes of the time, and at the two major influences on Western thought, namely 
utilitarianism and deontological theories, that have strongly impacted and changed the way 
in which people have viewed their rights and obligations in the two hundred years since the 
revolution. An understanding of these last are essential to crafting public policies that can 
better deflect the negative consequences of divorce.
Early Influences
In addition to Puritanical influences, American political theories played a big part 
in liberalizing the divorce laws of the 1700s. The secularization of divorce proceedings 
in colonial America is evidence of a long-term trend in the secularization of political 
attitudes and theories in western cultures. This turning away from the Bible for political 
and legal guidance was a result in particular o f the legal, political and social theories 
advanced by proponents of natural law and contract philosophies.3 These theories 
contributed significantly to the political birth of the United States and to the formation of 
our policies, laws and attitudes toward divorce.
3 Phillips, 210.
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Gradually during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, western political 
theories and philosophies began to deviate from the religious assumptions of medieval 
times. At the end of the sixteenth century, many found themselves weary of religious 
strife that had left them with incipient disbelief in Catholicism and Protestantism both. In 
addition, the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation had well prepared the 
intellectual and political thinkers of the day for a change. The Renaissance had 
celebrated human achievements and inspired a renewed interest in the humanism of 
classical Greece. The Protestant Reformation created new perspectives on how religion 
could interact with economics, politics and cultural attitudes. These shifts in thinking 
during the sixteenth century allowed political thought to move toward the theories of 
natural law and social contract — the seventeenth century became a time of transition.4
Although this paper cannot encompass a detailed history of natural law and 
contract philosophies, it is important to understand the role these emerging theories of the 
period played in shaping our current laws and attitudes toward divorce. In brief, 
philosophers of natural law developed theories based on nature and reason rather than on 
biblical or religious teachings. Also (and o f particular interest to divorce law), most 
natural law theorists came to support the principle of contract whereby a contractual 
obligation was binding only if both parties entered into it freely. In a social context, then, 
it became easy to see how the institution o f marriage fits the definition o f a civil contract,
4 For concise overviews of the impact of the thinkers and philosophers in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr W. 
O'Connor, eds., Morality, Philosophy, and Practice: Historical and Contemporary
Readings and Studies (New York: Random House, 1989), Chapter 7, "Stirrings o f the 
Modem Age,” 163-174, and Kagan, Chapter 18, "New Directions in Science and Thought 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 463-487.
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and it was not a far step to then allow divorce — a subsequent civil action in the case of 
failure to deliver on the part o f either spouse.
Early proponents o f natural law such as Hugo Grotius tried to interpret natural 
law within the parameters o f the Bible to proscribe divorce except in biblical terms. 
However, later philosophers such as John Locke relied strictly on nature and reason in 
developing arguments for allowing divorce.5 It is interesting to note that one can first 
find references to children in the matter of divorce in seventeenth century works. Earlier 
theological based writing on marriage and divorce referred to children as the 
procreational obligation of the marriage. In contrast, natural law with its focus on duty 
stressed the parental obligation, both during marriage and in the event o f divorce, to the 
children the marriage produced.6
In addition to secularizing the law, the turn to natural law in the seventeenth 
century led to a shift of emphasis that focused more on natural rights. We clearly see the 
results o f this shift in the seventeenth century where the distinction between natural law 
and natural rights is evident in the political rhetoric of the day. Natural law is a system 
based on God’s universal prescription for all people and individual rights and duties are 
found within this context. Natural rights, by contrast, are primary rights — every 
individual is endowed with them. Moral questions in natural law are analyzed with a 
focus on duties or obligations. Natural rights theories focus on the rights of the 
individual rather than on his or her obligations.
5 Phillips, 210-214.
6 Ibid., 214.
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By the end o f the 1600s, the distinction between natural law and natural rights had 
crystallized, and modem political theory was being built upon i t  Part of the reason for 
the shift in thinking may have come from the translation of the word ins orjus which can 
mean both "law" and "right" There is no evidence that ins in the thirteenth century was 
ever translated as a right that one could possess. However, between the thirteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, a shift began to take place in how the word ins was translated. 
Through this time frame, ins "shifts from 'the just thing itself (Aquinas), to 'power1 
(Ockham), then to 'ability' (Gerson and Suarez), then to 'quality' (Grotius), and finally, to 
liberty (Hobbes)."7
Thomas Hobbes, in fact, came to build a modem political theory on this 
difference:
The names lex and ius, that is to say, law and right, are often confounded, 
and yet scarce are there two words o f more contrary signification. For 
right is that liberty that law leaves us; and laws those restraints by which 
we agree mutually to abridge one another's liberty.8
This focus on rights became a fundamental premise for framers of the Constitution and
has had a great influence on the development o f the American culture.
Rights-Based, Duty-Based and Goals-Based Theories 
The real dilemma in crafting an acceptable, uniform divorce policy is not in convincing 
the American public that the welfare of our children is at stake. Rather, the dilemma is
7 Edel et al., eds., 109. For an in-depth discussion of this transition, Edel 
recommends Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Then Origin and Development 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and John Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), chapter 8.
8 Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Law II, 10 quoted in Edel et al., 108.
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one of balancing the responsibility or duty to one’s children with one’s right as an 
individual to divorce. Over the last two hundred years, deontological and utilitarian 
theories have dramatically reshaped how the American culture views rights and 
responsibilities, and importantly for this discussion, on the different ways we judge 
whether an action is moral or not. Understanding the distinction between rights-based, 
duty-based and goal-based rights and their underlying theories of ethics (primarily 
deontological and utilitarian theories), then, is essential to devising a uniform divorce 
policy that is acceptable to the broadest spectrum of our society.
According to Jeremy Waldron, Ronald Dworlrin first made the distinction 
between rights-based, duty-based and goal-based theories in the 1970s. Dworkin holds 
that theories of political morality are based on requirements to act or refrain from acting 
in a given set o f circumstances, and the bases of differing political theories are 
determined by how the requirements are generated and justified. From this point o f 
view, political moral theories can be categorized as rights-, duty- or goal-based.9
To illustrate the differences, Waldron uses the paradigm of a requirement for 
police and others to refrain from torturing individuals. If  we subscribe to this 
requirement because we believe no one should have to endure that kind of suffering, we 
are working from a rights-based theory (derived from the duty to hold each person as an 
end not a means). If we think the requirement is justified because torturing others 
debases the torturer, then we are working from a duty-based (deontological) theory.
9 Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories o f Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 1984), 12. Waldron points out it is difficult to hold a rights-based view if  one’s having 
a right is correlated with someone else’s duty—how can some theories be rights-based and 
others duty-based? Waldron recommends that a better definition o f rights for this purpose is 
“individual interests.”
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Finally, a goals-based (e.g., utilitarian) theory in this paradigm would view the torture 
unacceptable only in the light of the impact of the torture on the aggregate o f those 
having an interest (did the torture, for instance, provide a benefit to society that 
outweighed the pain to the individual).10
Deontological Influences 
In the last half of the eighteenth and first part of the nineteenth centuries, 
deontological and utilitarian theories emerged in Europe as the two most significant 
theories of modem Western ethics. Both of these theories, though very different in 
approach, emerged as people began to question the traditional Western assumptions that 
morality must come from a natural (or religious) source outside of man. The move away 
from this traditional view to a belief that the source for morality arises from within 
human nature led to a view that human beings could understand morality in terms o f self- 
govemance or autonomy rather than morality being imposed on human beings.11
Deontological thought is an ethics of duty by which morality is based on specific, 
foundational principles of obligations. It is based on the idea that human beings clearly 
have certain obligations in life, such as the care of their children and not to commit 
murder. These theories follow the premise that the moral person must act on the 
principles of obligation regardless o f the consequences of those actions. In simple terms, 
deontological theories are based on the input rather than the outcome of actions.
10 Ibid., 12-14.
11 J. B. Schneewind, “Modem Moral Philosophy,” A Companion to Ethics, ed. 
Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), 147.
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Immanuel Kant, whose work in the 1780s and 1790s revolutionized all branches 
o f thought,12 gives us a deontological theory in which moral action is judged by 
examining the nature o f the action and the will of the agent This derivation o f moral 
law from the will o f the agent lays the foundation for moral autonomy. Influenced by 
Grotius and Pufendorf, Kant agreed that moral duties include duties to oneself and others, 
but he also argued that there is a single, self-evident principle of reason that would stand 
as a categorical imperative -  the foundation for all other ethical judgment Kant 
developed his discussion of ethics around the question, “What ought I do?” and he was 
concerned primarily with identifying the maxims or fundamental principles o f action that 
one ought to adopt
In answering the question “what ought I do,” Kant held that only maxims or 
principles that could be adopted by a plurality of persons could serve as moral 
principles.13 This categorical imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law, is the 
keystone to Kantian ethics; for Kant, principles that are not universalizable must be 
rejected. The Formula of Universal Law is most often quoted as: “Act only on the 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law.”14
The categorical imperative most commonly recognized and that has had the most 
cultural impact, however, is the Formula o f the End in Itself. This formula demands that 
one treat “humanity in your own person or in the person of any other never simply as a
12 Edel etal., 276-277.
13 Onora O’Neill, “Kantian Ethics,” A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), I75-L77.
14 Ibid., 177.
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means but always at the same time as an end.”15 Holding that persons are ends and 
should never be treated only as means has been the fundamental concept some 
philosophers have used for establishing rights-based theories even though Kant clearly 
worked from a concern for the rational integrity o f persons who would treat other people 
in a purely instrumental way.16
Utilitarianism
During the last quarter o f the 18th Century, the effects o f the industrial revolution 
created intense social pressures in England with the doubling of the population, the 
steadily increasing urbanization and the disruptions of industrialism. In this environment, 
Jeremy Bentham, a radical (not violent) reformer, advanced a complex theory o f utility to 
be used “as a test for moral action and a practicable standard for social policy, especially 
legislation.”17
From a basis of egoist hedonism that argued man was governed only by pain and 
pleasure and that both determined man’s actions, Bentham constructed a theory of 
utilitarianism in which an action was moral only if  its consequences were more favorable 
than unfavorable to everyone -  or provided the greatest happiness to the greatest number 
of people. Bentham argued that moral action is not dependent on natural laws or divine 
guidance, but rather by abstract moral principles. He also argued that social reform
15 Ibid., 178.
16 Waldron, 12-13.
17 Edel et al., 299.
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should be based on human knowledge of the motivation o f institutions, and on objective, 
quantifiable ways of calculating the pain-and-pleasure consequences o f actions.18
Since Bentham’s day, several forms of utilitarianism have emerged addressing the 
theoretical limitations of utilitarianism including rule, preference, ideal and welfare 
utilitarianism. All of these variations on Bentham’s original theory, however, have one 
factor in common: they are standards forjudging public action based on the “conclusion 
that the right action is that which maximizes utility (however constructed) summed 
impersonally across all those affected by that action.”19
Applications to Policy Reform 
In looking at these brief descriptions of deontological and utilitarian theories, it is 
obvious they differ in very fundamental ways. One (deontology) bases morality on 
principles of duty or obligation without regard for the consequences of the moral act (one 
must return a borrowed gun to its owner, even if  the owner states she is going to shoot 
someone with it). The other (utilitarianism) focuses strictly on outcome, i.e., actions that 
maximize the greatest good (torture of an individual may be permissible if  the 
information gathered in interrogation would save a great many lives). The one holds as a 
categorical imperative that no individual can be used as a means to an end, and the other 
asserts that the end (the greatest good) is all that counts and anything (or anyone) should 
be used to achieve the end.
18 Ibid., 298-299.
19 Robert Goodin, “Utility and the Good,” A Companion to Ethics, ecL Peter 
Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), 245.
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In today’s political discourse, the two most often heard arguments mirror the 
differences between these theories: either we cannot implement social policies that deny 
the individual rights of persons, or we must implement policies that promote the good o f 
society — even though some individual rights are lost (or trammeled, depending on the 
point of view). In creating the best public policies, lawmakers must focus their attention 
on finding ways to accommodate both of these very different types o f arguments — a 
seemingly insurmountable task on the surface, but one that can be accomplished if both 
sides have common goals. For instance, in divorce reform, some emphasize the 
individual rights of the spouse(s) desiring a divorce, while others worry about the effects 
on society o f making divorce too easy to obtain. But it is not difficult for people to agree 
that parents have an obligation or duty to care for their children. From this point of 
agreement, we can then work toward a change in current policy that will meet that end.
CHAPTER 5
THE RIGHT TO DIVORCE
As an introduction to his book, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities, Arthur J. 
Dyck quotes G.E.M. Anscombe as noting that English philosophers have helped construct 
"systems according to which the man who says W e need such-and-such, and will only get it 
this way' may be a virtuous character."1 Anscombe complains that this includes accepting 
as moral many circumstances that can only be called strictly unjust — that equate to "the 
judicial condemnation of the innocent"2 It is not difficult to perceive the current status of 
our divorce laws in exactly the same manner the individual's right to pursuit of happiness 
(divorce) through unilateral divorce systems has impacted unjustly on the quality of life o f 
children and women in our nation.
A hue and cry is rising to fix our divorce system gone awry, but the fix is problematic 
because it requires a shift from focusing on rights to focusing on responsibilities — from 
strict individualism to a more organic or community-based focus. The tension between 
individual rights and community responsibilities in seeking a divorce versus maintaining a
1 Arthur J. Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds of 
Community. (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1994), 3.
2 Ibid, 4.
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marriage remains at the core o f our inability to devise reforms to no-fault policies. This 
chapter investigates the impact of individual rights on divorce law.
Constitutional Influence 
As we have seen, our cultural traditions have made our society receptive to rights 
dominated thought and processes -- the appeal to rights is how we have always advanced 
our interests and causes. In the words of Benjamin R. Barber, "Rights are how we enter our 
political conversation; they are the chips with which we bargain, collateral in the social 
contract"3
In today's society, those rights are increasingly (one might even say obsessively) 
becoming focused on the private individual rather than on the individual as community 
member or citizen. This gives rise to an environment where a spouse can insist that it is his 
or her right to unilaterally end a marriage and walk away from dependent children leaving 
them both emotionally and economically bereft
Originally, however, the American emphasis on rights had a different purpose than to 
advance strictly personal interests. While Federalists and Anti-Federalists both saw the 
Constitution as a means of furthering rights, each camp had its own agenda for the use of a 
rights-based Constitution. The Federalists wanted a government capable of guaranteeing its 
citizens' rights; the Anti-Federalists wanted to be sure citizens' rights were protected from 
the government Barber links these differing interests to Hobbes and Locke: "In the
3 Benjamin A. Barber, "Constitutional Rights — Democratic Instrument or 
Democratic Obstacle," hi Th<* Framm and FmyfamgntaT Right* Robert A. Licht, editor, 
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992), 23.
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Federalist case, there is a Hobbesian faith in strong contract-based government as a 
guarantor of rights; in the anti-Federalist case there is a Lockean distrust of strong 
government that issues in a strong version of rights understood as constraints on 
government."4
In both cases, however, the individual rights protected by the Constitution were 
founded in political participation and civic responsibility. It was clearly understood that the 
rights of citizenry entailed civic responsibilities and duties. Today, this distinction has 
nearly disappeared, and rights have become something to which one is bom. We forget 
that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when entailed with civic duty, laid the 
cultural and political foundation for the communities in which we live. The sense of 
individual rights belonging to an actively participating citizen of the community has all but 
disappeared leaving only a notion of individual rights belonging to each as a person rather 
than as a citizen. According to Barber, "Rights cease to be a civic identity to be posited and 
won; they become a natural identity to be discovered, worn, and enjoyed."5 This attitude 
has led us to a place where individual rights have ceased to be the rights of citizens involved 
in a community but have become the personal, private rights of each individual to be left 
alone — to live as he or she pleases without regard for the community.6
This obsession with private rights (to the near exclusion of political discourse on the 
public good) is evident in many of the outcries against invasion of privacy: opposition to
4 Ibid., 25.
5 Ibid., 33.
6 Glendon, Mary Arm, Right* T alk- T h e  Im poverishm ent o f  Political rKsennrst* 
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 48.
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roadside sobriety checks, to the mandated use o f seat belts and motorcycle helmets, and to 
airport security checks, for example. These areas of concern that normally are considered 
community rights, or at least the responsibility o f citizens as members of a community, are 
given short shrift — they "are not weighed and. found wanting; they are ignored. The 
language of rights simply is not permitted to extend to them."7 This is exactly the case we 
find in the arena of marriage, divorce, and family law.
In addition, the Declaration o f Independence by affirming the right of the pursuit of 
happiness also encourages our tendency to view divorce as a right. The pursuit of 
happiness is a Lockean idea. Locke proposed that human beings develop a notion of 
happiness that goes beyond merely seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, and that we 
consciously pursue the goal of attaining happiness. According to Locke, the concept of the 
pursnit of happiness accounts "for the various and contrary ways men take, though all aim 
at being happy." Because we each seek happiness in our own, individual ways, and because 
the pursuit o f happiness is an inescapable part of being human, Locke believed that any 
society living within the guidance o f nature had to provide freedom or at least tolerance for 
individual goals of happiness.8
By including this right in the Declaration o f Independence, the citizens of the United 
States have been given a guarantee of freedom to pursue their own happiness each in his or
7 Barber, 34.
8 Michael P. Zuckert, "Thomas Jefferson on Nature and Natural Rights," in The 
Framers and Fundamental Rights Robert A. Licht, editor, (Washington, D.C.: The AEI 
Press, 1992), 161-162.
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her own respective, individual ways. Ronald Hamowy exactly captures the sense of this 
freedom:
They [citizens] may act as they choose in their search for ease, comfort, 
felicity, and grace, either by owning property or not, by accumulating wealth 
or distributing it, by opting for material success or asceticism, in a  word, by 
determining the path o f their own earthly and heavenly salvation as they alone 
see fit9
Locke, however, clearly understood the pitfall in our pursuit of happiness — in feet, he 
understood that pursuit as personal and individual from the outset In An. Essay Concerning 
Human-Understanding, Locke wrote he was "forced to conclude that good, the greater 
good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until 
our desire, raised proportionately to i t  makes us uneasy in the want of it" 10 (Italics are 
Locke's.) In other words, Locke concluded that the greater good only truly becomes our 
concern when it intersects with our own personal "desires”— in which case we will become 
"uneasy" and may then assert our "will" in the form of action to pursue our own happiness.
For the framers of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, however, 
rights in general, and the right to pursue happiness in particular, were not disconnected from 
the duty we owe the community, the responsibility to act without causing harm to others. 
Our problem, as Barber succinctly wrote, is that "the powerful alliance between rights and 
political emancipation, between the claim to be a person and the right to be a citizen, has 
come unstuck." Our conception of rights in the private individual sense has overshadowed
9 Ibid, 162, quoting Ronald Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 
William and Mary Quarterly, vol 36 (1979), 549.
10 John Locke, An-Essay. Concerning Human Understanding, ed., A. D. Woozley 
(New American Library, October 1974), 173.
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the underlying truth that rights belong to citizens and come entailed with community duties 
and responsibilities.11 Our arrival at this place of disconnected rights and responsibilities 
may partially account for the ease with which four hundred years of fault-based divorce law 
was supplanted with the no-fault policies of the 1970s.
Rights Talk
Contrary to some beliefs, this disconnect between individual rights and community
responsibilities is not new — it is not a product of the 1960s or 1980s. In fact, its symptoms
go back at least to the 19th century. For instance, in 1890 two lawyers, Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis, co-authored an article for the Harvard f .aw.Review titled "The Right
to Privacy." In this article, Warren and Brandeis stated:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a 
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time 
to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. . . . 
Gradually the scope of these legal rights [to life, liberty, and property] 
broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life — 
the right to be let alone.12
Nonetheless, while the tendency to appropriate rights as private, individual rights is an 
old theme in the American political landscape, the problem of rights talk that restricts and 
diminishes the effectiveness of political discourse is new.
In her book, R ig h ts  T a lk - T h p  TrnpnwnghTTipnt r>f P nK tira l D ig rn n ra ^  Maty Ann 
Glendon argues that this new version o f rights talk has become increasingly dominant over
11 Barber, 33.
12 Glendon, 47, quoting Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to 
Privacy," 4 Harvard Law Review, (1890) 193.
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the past thirty years. Glendon contends that our current rights talk is different from that of 
previous American eras (and that of other liberal democracies as well) in its "starkness and 
simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its 
exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect 
to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."13 While this abbreviated form of 
discourse may fit our media-influenced culture of political sound-bites, it does not lend 
itself to political discourse that opens avenues of compromise and provides for the mutual 
understanding that is necessary for settling issues on common ground.
The issues of marriage and divorce have not been exempt from the malaise o f rights 
talk that diminishes responsibility and focuses on individual rights. To understand the 
effects of the individual right to divorce (in the pursuit of happiness), it is necessary to 
understand something of family law in the United States. When children are involved, the 
issues of divorce are inextricably tangled in our ways of defining family, the importance we 
put on family as a culture, and in family law. In fact, the most serious contention in the 
political discourse over divorce is the consequences of divorce to women and children — the 
family created in a marriage.
Until the 1960s it was more or less universally accepted in the United States that 
"family" meant a husband-father responsible for providing financially for his family, a wife- 
mother who was homemaker and primary care-giver, and their children. The law 
emphasized family solidarity — one could not usually bring suit against members o f oners
13 Glendon, x.
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immediate family (husband, wife, children) for example, and constitutional law supported 
this view until the late 1960s early 1970s.
Glendon uses the example of two Supreme Court cases to illustrate the quick shift in 
the Court's view o f the family. In describing a marriage in a 1965 birth control case 
involving a married couple's right to privacy, the Court stated: "Marriage is a coming 
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."14 Compare this 
language to the language of a subsequent 1972 birth control case involving an unmarried 
woman's right to privacy, and it is easy to see the shift from family unit to the focus on 
individuals disconnected from each other. The 1970 case cited that "the married couple is 
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up."15
Aside from the language of the courts, Glendon postulates that our individual rights- 
laden talk prevents us from expressing and understanding competing interests and goals. 
Glendon reminds us that thinking and speaking of divorce in terms of rights makes it 
difficult to "take account of the obvious fact that the public has a much greater interest in 
the conditions under which children are being raised than in the ways that adults generally 
choose to arrange their lives."16 This lack of social focus is obvious in the feet that the
14 Ibid., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
15 IbicL, 123, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
16 Ibid., 125.
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United States does not have a coherent national family policy, and that we are only slowly 
moving toward policy that makes a distinction between childless marriages and marriages 
with children.
The Major Political Parties and Family Issues
None of this is to say that families or family issues are forgotten or unattended by 
three of our largest political parties, the Republicans, the Democrats and the Libertarians. 
To the contrary all of them include statements and proposals regarding families and 
governments’ proper role in family issues. The underlying problem, however, remains in 
the degree of importance each places on the role of individual rights.
The Libertarian Party, as can be expected, places the utmost importance on individual 
rights. In fact, their Statement of Principle (which serves as a preamble to the party 
platform) states:
We the members of the Libertarian Party, challenge the cult of the omnipotent 
state and defend the rights of the individual. We hold that all individuals have 
the right to exercise sole dominion over their own lives, and have the right to 
live in whatever manner they choose, so long as they do not forcibly interfere 
with the equal right of others to live in whatever manner they choose.17
Consistent with this opening statement, the Libertarians oppose government 
regulation of the lives of individual and interference with private property. Further, the 
platform states that Libertarians "oppose all interference by government in the areas and 
contractual relations among individuals.”18
17 1998 Libertarian Party Platform, Libertarian Party web site (online), accessed on 
6 April 2000, available from http://www.lp.org/pIatform/; Internet.
18 Ibid.
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Of families specifically, the Libertarian Platform states, “We support protection of the 
integrity of families and households as contractual institutions against government intrusion 
and interference.”19 Although the platform does not mention the issues of divorce, it is 
obvious that the Libertarians call most strongly for the rights o f individuals and would 
support the right of consenting parties to divorce without further involvement from the 
government on the issues of division of assets, child custody or support. In fact, the 
Libertarian platform indirectly addresses this issue by stating that individuals should be free 
to make their own choices and then be free to be responsible for them; that governmental 
intervention through laws that deny individuals the opportunity to exercise their decisions 
(e.g., to divorce) actually encourages irresponsibility.
The Republican and Democrat platforms both address the issue of families in terms of 
strong families creating the foundation for improving social problems and improving the 
quality of life for everyone. Both platforms address remedies for many of the economic 
issues that make family living difficult, such as tax breaks for working parents, adequate 
health care availability and education opportunities. The major difference for the two 
parties is the means of achieving these ends.
The Republicans work for minimal government intervention, stressing that our 
religious, community and private groups of all kind are the best sources for “tackling the 
social ills that government programs have only worsened.”20 In this regard, the Republicans
19 Ibid.
20 TQQ6  T? epnhlfran  Party  P latform  Republican Party web site (online), accessed on 
6 April 2000, available from http://www.yoIogop.org/pIat6.htm; Internet.
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agree with, the Libertarians that people will Ieam to be most responsible for their actions 
through other than governmental means.
The Democrats, however, choose alternatives that require more government 
involvement. Their platform specifically addresses the need for laws that allow parents to 
take time off without pay or work flex-time to attend school functions, parent-teacher 
conferences or take a child to the doctor. More specifically to the issue of divorce, 
however, the 1996 Democratic Platform included a section on child support calling for a 
crackdown on deadbeat parents, stating, “If you neglect your responsibility to your children, 
we will suspend your license, garnish your wages, track you down, and make you pay.”21
The Communitarian Perspective 
While not a political party, the communitarian movement should be noted here as 
having the most specific platform that deals with the issues of divorce. As noted in Chapter 
One, the communitarian movement is a leading group in the call for divorce reform. The 
movement is a nonsectarian, nonpartisan coalition of individuals and organizations whose 
purpose is “to shore up the moral, social, and political environment.”22 The 
communitarians believe that strong individual liberties presume strong responsibilities, and 
that the best way to achieve strong individual liberties depends on bolstering families,
21 t QQ* rv m n r r a t f r  Par ty  Platform  1 Democratic Party web site (online); accessed on 
6 April 2000; available from http://www.democrats.org/hq/resources/platform/rndex.html; 
Internet.
22 tq q t  Rwpnrwtvff r nm m nnitarian  P latform , The Communitarian Network web 
site (online); accessed on 4 April 2000; available from 
http://www.communitariannetwork.org/pIatforintexLhtm; Internet.
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schools and neighborhoods as the foundations of civil society. The movement has a centrist 
philosophy focused on “finding effective ways to restore social and moral consensus 
without a small group of people imposing a set of behaviors and values on all of us.”23
In the Responsive Communitarian Platform, a seminal document o f the 
communitarian movement, a communitarian perspective is defined as recognizing both 
individual human dignity and the social dimensions of human existence, and the connection 
between strong individual liberties and the active maintenance of the institutions of society.
In order to bring the regard for individual rights into a better relationship with a sense 
of personal and civic responsibilities, the communitarians emphasize starting with the 
family. To accomplish this, the communitarians focus on the premise that bringing children 
into the world entails a moral responsibility to provide not only material necessities, but 
also moral education, which requires that the parents be present in the lives of their children. 
The platform recommends specific changes to facilitate this, including workplaces with 
flexible opportunities for parents to attend to their roles as parents, a realignment o f our 
attitudes toward child-rearing, recognition that children are best served by a two-parent 
family, and changes in divorce laws that would modify, but not prevent, divorce.
Additionally, many of the voices heard in the debate over divorce are communitarian. 
Amitai Etzioni, Mary Ann Glendon, and William A. Galston, as well as The Council on 
Families in America, are representative of this group.
23 Ibid.
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The Case For Reform 
The view in constitutional law of maritaL partners as separate individuals is most 
evident in no-fault divorce law that recognizes little or no connection between partners o f a 
marriage beyond an easily broken legal contract to live together as husband and wife. As 
we have seen, no-fault laws allow either party to unilaterally seek divorce for no better 
reason than incompatibility — which translates into the pursuit of happiness for at least one- 
half of the partners in the marriage contract Consequently, the change from fault to no­
fault divorce laws had the effect of de-emphasizing the "right" to remain married and 
emphasizing the "right" to divorce.24
Perhaps even worse, the no-fault divorce laws emphasize the individual right to 
divorce. This right is singularly devoid of responsibility to the other marital partner or the 
children of the marriage, neither in regard to the other partner’s wishes for continuing or 
saving the marriage, nor in terms of continued duty or obligation to one's children once the 
marriage is dissolved.
The right to unilaterally decide to divorce exactly reflects what Sandel calls the notion 
of the “unencumbered self, independent o f roles and unbound by moral ties one chooses to 
reject.,,2s In other words, we have become disconnected from our roles and the associated 
responsibilities of being parents and spouses: unencumbered by the obligations or duties of 
a father or mother, for instance, one can simply walk away from a marriage and a family 
without feeling further responsibility.
24 Sandel, 108-109.
25 Ibid., 112.
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Unilateral, no-fault divorce possibly epitomizes the results of exercising individual 
rights with no concomitant acceptance of responsibilities. As Sandel points out, no-fault 
divorce law fails to respect traditional roles and penalizes mothers and homemakers who 
have lived their married lives as "situated selves" — people whose identities were constituted 
by their roles. These are the women who have depended on their husbands for economic 
support and in return cared for children and home so that their husbands could pursue their 
careers.26 In practice, this means that women and children frequently experience a 
significant decrease in their standard of living.
As the evidence of the fallout of divorce mounts, more and more voices are calling for 
divorce reform — in particular for cases of divorce involving children. From the Democrats, 
First Lady Hillary Clinton recently wrote in her syndicated newspaper column, "I think 
getting a divorce should be much harder when children are involved. . . . Divorce has 
become too easy because o f our permissive laws and attitudes."27 In a New„York, .Times 
editorial published in December of 1995, Communitarian William A. Galston wrote, 'Tor 
couples with dependent children, we should e liminate  unilateral no-fault [divorce]. . .  and 
return to an updated fault-based system, with the alternative of a five-year waiting period."28 
And in the last three years, eighteen states including Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
26 Sandel, 114.
27 Elizabeth Schoenfeld, "Drumbeats for Divorce Reform," Policy Review, May- 
June 1996,8.
28 Ibid.
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Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington have introduced proposals to 
reform their respective state laws.29
It becomes clear that there is a tremendous interest in reforming the no-fault divorce 
policies -  and there is a common ground among these groups that recognizes that healthy 
families create environments for people to reach their full potential whereas the division of 
families increases the likelihood of delinquency and crime. These are the factors, after all, 
that have a tremendous impact on the success or failure of our economic and political 
survival as a nation.30 It is likewise evident that the real challenge is constructing a policy 
reform that will be accepted in the current culture of individual rights while still retaining 
the facility to protect the victims of divorce (children, women and to some degree, the 
partners who truly wish to save their marriages).
The Responsibilities Of Divorce 
It is tremendously important in this discussion to always bear in mind the distinction 
between marriages with children and marriages without children. Margaret Mead most 
eloquently stated:
We badly need to recognize a new form of marriage — a marriage between 
childless partners with no comm itment to continuity. Such marriages should be 
easier to contract, should involve no automatic economic relationships, and 
should be capable of dissolution by mutual consent, without undue delay, cost 
or supervision from the constituted organs of society. On the other hand, 
marriages which are parental should be placed in a different category, and have
29 Kim A. Lawton, '"No Fault’ Divorce Under Assault, Christianity Today, April 8, 
1996, vol. 40 n4,85.
30 Mary Ann Glendon, R igh ts T alV- T h^ Im poverishm ent n f  Political DisrniiTSe 
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 126.
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built into them, once more the conception of what marriage with children is — a 
lifelong relationship which will end only with death."31
In keeping with this, it might be helpful to create two separate, distinct divorce laws: one
for childless marriages, and one for "parental marriages."
Divorce in Nnn-parental Marriages 
With the exception of the unilateral right to divorce, the current no-fault divorce laws 
are basically consistent with Mead's recommendation for childless marriages: they are 
dissolvable without undue delay, cost or supervision from the courts or government. The 
issue then for these marriages is mutual consent. Several possibilities for cases lacking 
consent come to mind: provisions could be allowed that force the suing partner to maintain 
the non-consenting partner’s standard of living for a specified time; marriage counseling 
could be imposed by the courts; or unilateral petitions could be denied except in the case of 
abuse, adultery or other egregious forms of behavior (basically a return to the old fault 
system). While all three of these options would require a longer delay, more cost and more 
supervision from the courts, they still offer recourse to the non-consenting spouse who, after 
all, has rights, too.
Of these options, however, the provision for maintaining a non-consenting spouse’s 
standard of living has the most appeal for several reasons. Spouses who know that a 
unilateral divorce will cost them (attorney’s fees and court costs in addition to monies or 
property awarded to the non-consenting spouse) should be more likely to work harder with
31 As quoted by Wheeler, 172.
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the non-consenting spouse to arrive at a mutually acceptable divorce agreement (outside the 
court's jurisdiction) or reconcile the differences in the marriage on their own.
This option also creates a cushion for the non-working spouse, who though childless, 
may not have worked outside the home during the marriage and finds him- or herself 
unprepared to re-enter the workforce. In an article in Dissent (Summer 1991), Susan MoIIer 
Okin argues that this option is a means of diminishing the disparity between men's and 
women's financial situation after divorce — and in that regard, this option works well for 
divorces in parental marriages also. Okin also suggests that the lost economic potential of a 
marriage should be considered: "Change must begin with the recognition that future 
earning power is the principal asset of most marriages."32 (Italics are Okin’s.) She 
recommends that the arrangement after divorce should "aim to equalize the standards of 
living of both post-divorce households," and that the amount awarded and the length of time 
the support would continue should depend on both the length as well as the practices of the 
marriage (i.e., did both partners work outside the home, and if so, what was the difference 
in their paychecks, opportunities for advancement, benefits packages, etc.).33
The problems with this option, however, are easily recognized: it increases the 
likelihood of litigation (as opposed to simply filing a petition for divorce); it would increase 
the workload of an already overburdened family court; and its fair and equitable 
administration and enforcement would require new ways of thinking. Of all these obstacles, 
administration and enforcement might be the hardest to overcome. For instance, as we see
32 Susan MoIIer Okin, "Economic Equality After Divorce: 'Equal Rights* or Special 
Benefits?" Dissent, Summer 1991,385.
33 Ibid., 386.
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currently with child support, collecting court-ordered payments can be difficult. Obviously 
the most efficient way to enforce a financial ruling of this sort is to garnish wages — and 
that brings us to a whole different issue of individual rights!
In the end, however, this type of approach seems fair to all parties because it addresses 
the rights of both spouses and requires actions based on the recognition of attendant 
responsibilities. Each spouse may have the right to divorce, but that right does not include 
neglecting to meet obligations one accepted on entering the marriage.
O iv n rre  in  M a rr ia g e s  w ith  P h ild ren
The most serious concern in the current discourse on divorce, of course, is the well­
being of the children of divorce, which as we have seen, is also the most common argument 
for no-fault divorce reform. This common thread could be the key factor to developing a 
new divorce policy — that all-elusive common ground. Even arguments that downplay the 
need for divorce reform acknowledge that life is more difficult both emotionally and 
economically for the children of divorce — here the differences are only in the degree and 
the longevity of these ill effects.
The real difficulty in fashioning divorce reform policy lies in the substantially 
differing approaches to how the reform should proceed. This is due in large part to the 
underlying belief systems about marriage, divorce, individual rights and community 
responsibility that ultimately affect the ways people approach the issue. Basically, there are 
two camps in this discussion; both seek to ameliorate as much as possible the economic and 
emotional damages caused by divorce but one does so by focusing on saving the marriage, 
the other by focusing on just and fair treatment in the event of divorce.
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For instance, the Council on Families in America ( working from a communitarian, 
pro-marriage perspective) recommends such changes as:
♦ Reform no-fault divorce laws to emphasize the importance of marriage 
especially where children are involved; give support of the law to the partner 
trying to save the marriage.
♦ Formulate vision statements that establish goals to strengthen marriage and 
denounce out-of-wedlock childbirths.
♦ Change the tax code to favor marriages, e.g., by eliminating the marriage 
penalty, increasing the personal exemption, and creating a $1,000 per child 
refundable tax credit.
4  Provide funds (credits or vouchers) for parents who leave school or the
workplace for an extended period of time to care for young children.
♦ Replace the welfare system with approaches that discourage unwed
motherhood and that empower families, e.g., mandatory identification of 
fathers before benefits can be used, programs that encourage unwed teenage 
mothers to place their children up for adoption, favor marriages-with- 
children in the allocation of subsidized housing, and create a poverty tax 
credit whereby taxpayers could directly allocate a portion of their taxes to 
nonprofit organizations that work to reduce child poverty and strengthen 
families.
♦ Reassess state and federal child support enforcement programs and foster
more marriage and more fatherhood.
♦ Provide an annual measurement of the nation’s marital health using the
following statistics: percent of adults married, percent of first intact
marriages, numbered of births to married parents, percent of children living
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with their natural parents, and percent o f children living with two married 
parents.34
All of these recommendations focus on strengthening marriages and promoting a 
culture where marriage is a valued institution. Additionally, these recommendations play 
best to those who are moved by virtue, civic responsibility, a sense of community and 
(without referring to it) religious duty.
The other side o f the reform recommendations comes from those who are less 
impelled to see marriage as a sacred institution to be saved at all or nearly all costs — 
instead they are seeking justice and equity in the event of divorce. This camp sees divorce 
as an inevitable corollary to many marriages but not necessarily as something that needs to 
be devastating to the women and children involved. Recommendations from this side 
include:
♦ Distributing wealth and property equitably rather than equally; for example, 
a wife and two children equal three-fourths of the family and should receive 
three quarters of the family property and wealth.
♦ Financial distributions that recognize the future earnings of the primary 
bread winner including considerations such as benefits and professional 
status.
34 The Council on Families in America, "Marriage in America: A Report to the
Nation," Promises To Keep:__Decline and Renewal of Marriage in.America, David
Popenoe, Jean Bethke Flshtain, and David Blankenhom, eds. (Lantham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 313-314.
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♦ Garnishing of wages to insure support payments are made.
♦ Decrees that assign the home to the custodial parent.35
Looking at these differing views of the problem only reinforces the need to carefully 
analyze the motivations and expectations that accompany any proposed divorce reform. To 
successfully appeal to both camps (and any others in between), divorce reform must strike a 
balance between individual rights (with its focus on the procedure of divorce) and 
community responsibility (with its focus on encouraging marriages).
Conclusion
In her book, Tbe-Way-We-Never-Were:_ American Eamilies and the. Nostalgia Trap, 
Stephanie Coontz reminds us that children, while certainly their parents’ responsibility, are 
also the responsibility of the community at large. To make her point, Coontz relates the 
story of a Jesuit missionary from France and his encounter with the Montagnais-Naskapi 
Indians in 16th century North America. The Jesuit was appalled by the Montagnais- 
Naskapi traditions of child-rearing and egalitarian relations between husbands and wives, in 
particular the lax sexual code tolerated amongst the women. After many failed attempts to 
persuade the Naskapi men to impose stricter monogamy on then wives, the Jesuit finally 
came to what he believed was an incontestable reason for his side. When the Jesuit 
explained to a Naskapi man that if his wife had sexual relations with others, he would never
3S See Weitzman; Okin; Talbot; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion nf 
Equality:—The. Rhetoric and. Reality nf-Divnrre Reform, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991); and Kay Henna HOI, “An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault 
Divorce Law, California Law Review, Jan 1987, vol. 75, issue 1:319.
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know for sure if the children she bore were really his, the Naskapi man answered: "Thou 
hast no sense.. . .  You French people love only your own children; but we love all the 
children of our tribe."36
While divorce reform gets bogged down in individual rights versus community 
responsibility arguments, political priorities, and special interest group straggles, we seem 
to be losing sight of what amounts to the common ground for all factions: the welfare of 
our nation's children. Our individual right to bear children brings a responsibility to care for 
them; our right to live in an orderly society bears the responsibility of providing for our 
children so that society may continue. In the end, the individual right to divorce must not 
be allowed to trump all other family and community rights.
36 Coontz, 231.
CHAPTER 6
TOWARD DIVORCE REFORM
While few will argue that a high divorce rate is good for the nation, there are 
many, very diverse arguments for why a high divorce rate is not good. Many of these 
arguments center around the importance o f intact families in our culture. As evidence of 
this widely held belief, consider that the Carter administration was elected in part on a 
campaign that promised a political focus on family issues; that during the Reagan and 
Bush administrations, there were pushes from the religious right to reestablish family 
values that emphasized the importance o f the traditional family; and that President 
Clinton also used pro-family language as part of his election campaign. In short, across 
time and politics, Americans believe in the value of families to society, and much o f the 
debate over divorce is embedded in this larger issue of family values.1
Since 1996, and within the context o f concern for “family values,” eighteen states 
including Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia
1 This focus on family m politics has also led to many efforts to define family: do 
we mean the traditional family, the extended family, a family including close friends? 
Can people with alternative lifestyles be successful as parents and constitute a family? 
This issue, however, is beyond the scope o f this paper, which focuses only on the effects 
of divorce on the traditional, mother-father-and-children unit.
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and Washington have introduced proposals to reform their respective state divorce laws. 
The Michigan initiative was introduced on Valentine's Day 1997 by State Representative 
Jessie Dalman. Dalman proposes to return to a fault-based system in which there is no 
unilateral divorce except in instances where cause can be proven, specifically adultery, 
physical abuse, desertion, substance abuse or imprisonment The proposal, supported by 
the Michigan Family Forum, would require divorcing parents to receive counseling on 
the effects of divorce on children and to submit a post-divorce parenting plan. Dalman 
also proposes incentives for premarital counseling including a break on the fee paid for 
the marriage license and a reduced waiting period after applying for a license. Over thirty 
states have requested copies of the Michigan bill.2
Although no significant reform has been passed to date, the 1990s was obviously 
the decade of no-fault divorce reform at the state level. At the broadest level, the 
argument against easy, no-fault divorce ultimately has taken one of two tacks — either it 
is not good for society because it contributes to the worst of a community’s ills (increased 
crime, lower education statistics, higher drug addiction, etc.), or it is not good for the 
economy (often for the same reasons). In either case, maintaining traditional family 
relationships (i.e., protecting children from the effects of divorce) has been seen as the 
key to alleviating these social problems.
Although the ramifications of divorce for children are clear, the solution for 
policy makers has proven problematic, primarily because American culture, steeped in 
individual rights and focused on the pursuit o f happiness, does not support a return, to
2 Lawton, 85.
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fault-based divorce laws that make divorce more difficult to obtain. Before analyzing the 
reasons for our failure to implement divorce law reform in the 1990s, however, we need 
to understand the underlying arguments put forth by each group seeking reform so that 
future policy efforts can draw on overlapping values to fashion divorce reform that will 
be more acceptable to the American public.
The Issues and the Players 
The overriding issue for most proponents of divorce reform in the 1990s is a 
growing concern over the erosion of family values. Defining the term “family values,” 
however, is problematic because it means different things in different contexts to 
different groups. The Council on Families offers the following definition when referring 
to family values:
The loving two-married-parent family  is the best environment for children — 
the place where children gain the identity, discipline, and moral education 
that are essential for their full individual development. And, as the 
institution which most effectively teaches the civic virtues of honesty, 
loyalty, trust, self-sacrifice, personal responsibility, and respect for others, 
the family is an irreplaceable foundation for long-term social efficacy and 
responsibility.3
This description is consistent with the communitarian call for "restoring the moral 
voice" starting with, the family and insisting that "bringing children into the world entails 
a moral responsibility to provide, not only material necessities, but also moral education 
and character formation."4 Furthering this idea, the communitarian platform states that
3 The Council on Families in America, 294.
4 1991 Responsive Communitarian Platform (online).
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two-parent families are better able to discharge their child-raising duties, that divorce is 
not in the best interest o f children, and that "divorce laws should be modified, not to 
prevent divorce, but to signal society's concern."5
Allan Carlson, president of the Rockford Institute in Illinois and director of its 
Center on the Family, concurs in even stronger language. In his 1995 article "The 
Family: Where Do We Go from Here?" Carlson states that "we need to raise the political 
visibility and muscle of the family cause, relative to the demands o f the corporate 
economy, the state, and the new world order."6 While Carlson supports the repeal o f no­
fault divorce laws, he is also concerned with over-regulation of pro-family issues: "In the 
United States, the greatest threat to democratic rule is the federal court system, which 
over the last half-century has struck down hundreds of democratically created pro-family 
measures"7 (emphasis is Carlson’s).
The Christian communities have also been active in calling for divorce reform 
based primarily on family issues. In 1991, the bishops o f the Catholic Church published 
"Putting Children and Families First," a report that urged Catholics to reconsider "the 
consequences of permissive divorce" and called for modifications in divorce laws to 
"recognize the frequently devastating consequences of divorce on children."8 In line with
5 Ibid., 8.
6 Allan Carlson, "The Family: Where Do We Go from Here?" Society, Jul-Aug, 
1995,63.
7 Ibid., 64.
8 Lawton, 86.
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this, Protestant leaders are beginning  to call for policies that will save marriages. Mary 
Stewart Van Leeuwen, a professor o f gender studies at Eastern College, recommends that 
churches develop a "just divorce theory" similar to the criteria theologians have 
developed on war. Van Leeuwen adds that the "default option [in a divorce] should 
obviously be toward the maintenanc e  of marriage."9
The issue for feminists, however, is framed differently. Rather than addressing a 
concern over family values, feminists have rallied behind the issue of equality of 
treatment in the law which has led women and children into economic catastrophe. 
Martha Fineman argues that by focusing on the issue of equal treatment before the law, 
reforms of fault-based divorce and family law "have actually reinforced men's control 
within the family before and after divorce."10
Additionally, recent statistics that indicate that single-parent families headed by 
women are the "new poor" are part of the argument Fineman uses to advance her call for 
"result-equality" laws that place individuals in essentially equal positions. Such rules 
would take into account the different positions of men and women in our society and 
would attempt to achieve parity in the economic positions of the individuals as a result of 
the divorce.11 Fineman recognizes, however, that reforming  current divorce and family 
laws to ensure that both parties leave the marriage on more or less equal footing may
9 Ibid.
10 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion o f Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality
o f Divorce Reform (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 3.
11 Ibid., 39.
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appear unequal, will demand more justification, and will require a shift in the use o f one 
of the traditional weapons o f feminism, i.e., insistence on "equality."12
Competing Positions 
While we might find a majority o f Americans who agree no-fault divorce reform 
is needed to address the economic inequities experienced by minor children, it would be 
difficult, indeed, to find a consensus among these many competing positions in the 
United States today on what form the change in policy should take. For example, should 
we return to fault-based divorces, should we modify the current divorce policy, should we 
leave no fault divorce basically intact and concentrate on strengthening the rules applied 
to children in divorce, or should there be new rules applied to marriages once a couple 
comes before the court seeking divorce? Not surprisingly, each of these options has its 
advocates.
Return to Fault-Based Policies 
Although the Christian community has put forth few organized, politically active 
calls for divorce reform, the Catholic Church, for instance, would welcome and probably 
actively support a return to fault-based divorce (this would secularize and enforce the 
Catholic Church's ecclesiastical position). The lack of political participation, so far, may 
partly be attributed to our constitutional separation of church and state, and also to the 
fact that legal divorce is an entirely secular affair occurring without consideration of 
religion. The Catholic Church deals with this secular, legal issue by refusing to recognize
12 Ibid., 190.
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the validity of civil divorce in the lives o f its parishioners. Because divorce is an
unacceptable answer to a troubled marriage, legal divorce is not recognized as valid in the
Catholic Church, and Catholic members cannot remarry in the eyes of the church without
an annulment or dispensation from the church.
One might assume from this that American Catholics probably divorce in fewer
numbers than Americans of other Christian denominat i n g  but studies show that this is
not true. For example, Robert D. Shull and Joseph Lee Rodgers reported in a 1995 study
that religiosity was not a significant factor in curtailing the divorce rate.
Most surprising here was the finding that the hypothesized negative 
relationship between Catholicism and the post-no-fault divorce rate was not 
supported. . . .  Thus, the religiosity finding in this study may suggest that 
belief in the sanctity of marriage and adherence to religious precepts, though 
perhaps once strong enough to prevent the dissolution of marriages, have 
weakened.13
Protestant denominations also deplore divorce, but do not have the same strictures 
as the Catholic Church. According to Kim A. Lawton, writing for Christianity Today. 
part o f the reason Protestant leaders have not been more active in calling for no-fault 
reform may be due to the fact that many Protestant ministers have experienced divorce 
themselves. In fact, a 1995 study by Hartford Seminary shows that one-fourth of female 
and one-fifth of male clergy have been divorced.14 In terms of setting or recommending 
divorce policy, then, the clergy end-up in the same place as the lawyers who write the
13 Robert D. Shull and Joseph Lee Rodgers, "The Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law
on the Divorce Rate Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education, and 
Religiosity," Journal of Marriage and the Family, May 1995: 486-487.
14 Lawton, 86.
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legislation: saying people should not divorce is difficult if you are divorced yourself. Or 
as David Ferguson, executive director of the Center for Marriage and Family Intimacy in 
Austin, Texas is quoted as eloquently saying: "You're not going to prioritize or
emphasize ministry within your church any more than that truth is real in your own 
home.”15
Others, such as Tom McMillen, Executive Director of the Rocky Mountain 
Family Council, strongly urge a return to fault-based divorce arguing that fault-based 
divorce protects children and abused wives, strengthens families, helps prevent dads from 
feeling like they have no say in child support awards, and ultimately seeks justice: "Isn’t 
it time we started talking about justice and roll back the failed social experiment known 
as no-fault divorce?"16
Finally, a surprising call for a return to fault-based divorce comes from the 
economic quarter. In his article "The Economic Analysis of the Effect o f No-Fault 
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate," Martin Zelder makes the persuasive case that easy, 
no-fault divorces have a negative economic effect by allowing people to divorce who 
would otherwise stay married under fault-based laws. Using a model based on 
assumptions of rational, utility-maximizing behavior, Zelder concludes that couples with 
a greater fraction of spending on children (i.e., a higher investment in non-transferable
15 David Ferguson as quoted by Kim A. Lawton, ’"No Fault’ Divorce Under 
Assault,” Christianity Today. April 8, 1996:86.
16 Tom McMiHen, "Finding Fault with No-Fault Divorce," (article online) Rocky 
Mountain Family Council web site, accessed April 1998, available from 
http://www.rmfc.org/, Internet
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goods, namely their children) were less likely to divorce under fault-based laws. Zelder 
concludes that no-fault divorce creates an economic inefficiency (too many divorces), and 
we should return to fault-based laws which allow the "right" number of divorces to occur.
Interestingly, he uses the commentaries o f Weitzman, Glendon, Fineman and Jacob to 
support the validity of his conclusions.17
Modifying No-Fault Divorce
The communitarians (Etzioni, Glendon, Galston, Elshtain et al.) recommend 
modifying current no-fault law. The communitarians actually recommend changes on 
three levels: modifying the divorce laws, improving child welfare laws and providing 
some types of relief that would enable more people to stay married.18
Preeminent communitarian William A. Galston suggests a policy of divorce 
reform that would institute a two-tier system of divorce: one set of rules for couples who 
do not have dependent children and another set o f rules for those who do. For couples 
without children, Galston sees no problem with the no-fault divorce laws the way they 
stand today. For couples with dependent children, however, he recommends eliminating 
unilateral no-fault divorces with a return to "an updated fault system" with an alternative 
of a five-year waiting period for a divorce to become final. And even for couples with 
dependent children who mutually consent to divorce, Galston recommends policy
17 Martin Zelder, "The Economic Analysis o f the Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law 
on the Divorce Rate," The Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 16 no. 1,242-262.
18 Jean Elshtain, Enola Aird, Amitai Etzioni, William Galston, Mary Ann 
Glendon, Martha Minow, and Alice Rossi, "A Communitarian Position on the Family," 
National Civic Review (Winter 1993), 25-35.
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changes requiring a mandatory waiting period o f at least one year that would allow the
couple time for "reflection, counsel and mediation."19
In addition, Galston supports the "children first” principle recommended by Mary
Ann Glendon, another preeminent communitarian. This principle, according to Glendon
should govern the allocation and distribution o f property in divorce law:
[T]he judge's main task would be to piece together, from property and 
income and in-kind personal care, the best possible package to meet the 
needs of children and their physical custodian. Until the welfare of the 
children had been adequately secured in this way, there would be no 
question of, or debate about, "marital property.” All property, no matter 
how or when acquired, would be subject to the duty to provide for the 
children.20
Another communitarian supporter, Mary Ann Mason, adds that the "children first" 
principle should extend to custody decision-making: she recommends a return to the 
legal presumption that mothers are the best custodians for young children. Mason bases 
her recommendation on two premises: I) the high incidence o f custody litigation in an 
environment where family law offers little if  any guidance on securing the "best interests" 
o f the child; and 2) the belief that women are biologically and emotionally better suited to 
providing "mothering" for children. Mason contends that the current "primary caretaker" 
presumption forces both parents to vie for custodial rights in court, increases the 
likelihood of litigation, and creates the possibility of spousal blackmail where the threat
19 William A. Galston, Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal o f Marriage in 
America, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 286-287.
20 Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 95, quoted in William A. Galston, "The 
Reinstitutionalization o f Marriage," Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage 
in America (Lanham. MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 286.
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of litigation can be used to intimidate the mother into accepting less than reasonable 
property or child support allocations. Mason argues that under a "maternal presumption," 
the father would be less likely to litigate because he would have to provide a 
preponderance of evidence that he in fact provides the "mothering" role in the parent- 
child relationship.21
Some o f the specific reforms to the children’s welfare and tax laws the 
communitarians recommend include creating a more enforceable and straightforward 
child support system;22 disallowing settlements between parents until adequate provisions 
have been made for their minor children;23 tax code changes that favor married families; 
and credit vouchers for parents who leave school or the workplace for an extended period 
of time to care for young children.24
The communitarian premise that no parent can divorce a child can be seen as an 
extension of Mead's comment on a lifelong relationship between two people who have
21 Mary Ann Mason, "The De-Regulation of Family Law: In Whose Best 
Interests?" The Responsive Community, Spring 1993,48-51.
22 William A. Galston, "A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family," 
Moral Infrastructure. (New York: S t Martin's Press, Inc., 1995), 146-147.
23 Elshtain etal., 31.
24 Council on Families in America, 313-314.
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children: having children creates an irrevocable bond, like it or not, good or bad, between 
the parents.25
Call It "No Fault," But Change the Rules 
Feminists also want changes in no-fault divorce laws — or perhaps more 
appropriately to the portion of the divorce laws that concern the distribution of property 
and child support and alimony payments. However, feminists are more cautious about 
recommending radical changes to the unilateral aspect o f no-fault divorce. Some of the 
concern about changing the “easy” divorce laws involves issues of control and spouse 
and child abuse. Some women’s groups in Michigan have argued that “Dalman’s bills 
could trap wives into dangerous situations” because the bills require proof o f the abuse. 
However, there is consensus among most women’s groups that the law needs to change at 
least regarding its economic effects on women and children.26
Surprisingly, although feminists have recognized the need for change in this area 
since Lenore Weitzman completed her study on the effects of divorce on women and 
children in 1985, women’s organisations seem to have put little political effort into
25 It is unclear what Mead meant by "will end only with death." She could have 
meant that in fact the marriage itself should not be allowed to end. In the context of 
relationships (the law and marriage contracts notwithstanding), one can also assume she 
meant that the commitment to the children of a marriage brings with it a  change in the 
relationship of the father and mother — a change that they would not have experienced 
without the birth of the children; a change that cannot be undone m their lifetimes.
26 Lawton, 85-86. For a more in-depth analysis o f the pros and cons of this issue, 
see “End No-Fault Divorce?” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public 
Life, August/September 1997: 24-30, for an informative debate o f the pros and cons of 
this position.
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divorce reform. In. 1987, Kay Herma Hill concluded her appraisal of no-fault divorce in
the state of California by stating:
As Weitzman has shown in such dramatic detail, women and children have 
borne the brunt of the transition that took place in California’s legal 
regulation o f the family between 1970 and 1987. Further changes are 
required to prevent such unfortunate and unnecessary results, but a return to 
the family law of 1970 is not one o f them.27
This underlying caution is still evident among feminists today. According to 
Martha Fineman this reluctance to change the no-fault laws is an outgrowth of the way 
feminists have traditionally framed their arguments in order to obtain political support. 
Fineman observes that feminists have historically used two images to gain access to 
social institutions: the image of women as victims and the image of equal treatment. In 
the original reform for divorce these two images worked powerfully together to help 
advance feminist issues, but unfortunately, the exaggeration of the images had 
unfortunate consequences.28 Under the guise of neutral fairness, “equality” in property 
distribution and child custody has acquired legitimacy in the process of the law, but as we 
have already seen, the consequences of these gender-neutral laws are not equally borne.29 
Feminists, then, are fully aware of the problems created by the fault-based divorce 
reforms, but seem unable to break out of traditional patterns of obtaining political access,
i.e., the use of gender-neutral equality as an argument for change.
27 Kay Herma Hill, “An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law,: 
California Law Review, Jan 1987, vol. 75, issue 1:319.
28 Fineman, 189.
29 Ibid., 174.
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In a break with this pattern, Fineman suggests adopting “results-equality” rather 
than the gender-neutral “rules-equality.” She argues that “to achieve equality of result” in 
a divorce, it may be necessary to treat spouses dissimilarly when distributing the marital 
property, including allocation o f post-divorce income to ensure adequate care of 
children.30 In this regard, she recommends policy changes similar to the communitarians 
and groups such as the Council on Families in America. Specifically, she recommends 
adoption of Victor Fuchs’ three general principles:
1. Child-centered policies are preferable to labor market interventions.
2. The child-centered benefits should be widely available — not 
conditioned on marital status, employment status, or income.
3. The cost o f the programs should be borne by the entire society through 
broad-based progressive taxes, not distributed through arbitrary 
methods with euphemistic names like “employer provided” day care.31
Finally, one of the original voices calling for reform based on the needs of 
children, Weitzman also recommends changes that include stronger child support rules; 
alimony for long-married, older housewives with little or no work experience; awards o f 
a greater share of property to the primary caretaker (usually the mother); consideration for 
full support of mothers of younger children in the early years o f the divorce; special 
considerations for the sale of the family home; recognition that career assets (e.g., 
enhanced earning capacity, medical insurance, retirement pensions, etc.) are marital 
assets that should be considered in the division of property; and stronger social and
30 Ibid., 176.
31 Victor Fuchs, Women’s Quest for Economic Equality (1988), 145-146 as 
quoted in Fineman, 177.
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economic supports for custodial parents.32 In short, the feminist point of view could be 
summed up as “leave unilateral, no-fault divorce in place but create an important caveat: 
a spouse can leave a marriage without cause, but not the responsibilities incurred by the 
marriage.”
Conclusion
Research clearly reveals a need for reform of our no-fault divorce laws — 
arguments against no-fault reform notwithstanding, no one can successfully argue that the 
status of children in divorced homes has not significantly changed due to the changes in 
alimony and child support that the no-fault law brings with it. It is evident, therefore, that 
reform is necessary and that it should rightfully focus on protecting the interests o f minor 
children who, under the current system, suffer not only economic setbacks, but also 
psychological ones as they cope with the loss of home, friends, stability and their sense of 
family.
Communitarian themes strongly identify with the welfare of children and
promote the belief that the rules involving the treatment of children in divorce cases
should change. In the instance of divorce policy, the communitarians advocate reform
that puts children first:
There is a need for changes in divorce laws to favor children and slow the
rush to divorce For divorces where children are involved there should be
a new set o f rules based on the principle o f 'children first.’ . . .  A parent
32 See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and 
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1985) for a complete discussion.
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should be able to divorce a spouse if  a marriage has irretrievably broken.
down, but a parent should never be allowed to divorce a child.33
To protect the rights o f children, communitarians advocate laws that would 
systematically increase child support and effectively enforce its collection, thus invoking 
the power of the government on behalf o f children. This shift to a focus on children also 
significantly changes the other two rights commonly associated with divorce: the right to 
be married and the right to divorce.
The communitarians and others who call for modifying the no-fault divorce law in 
favor o f children's welfare would re-frame the issue to place primary importance on a 
child's right to family and well being. One might term this the "right to have responsible 
parents." This indeed would cause a radical change in the application o f current family 
law!
The challenge, then, is to create a policy that will achieve the end o f protecting 
children of divorce while most effectively satisfying the diversity o f interested parties 
whose opinions on the best means for success vary widely. To a large extent, meeting 
this challenge will depend on applying the right methodology, focusing on a systemic 
analysis of the problem, and implementation o f solutions that can identify and avoid the 
kinds o f unintended, negative results that accompanied the reform in the 1970s.
33 Elshtain, et al., 30-31.
CHAPTER 7
CREATING A POLICY FOR DIVORCE REFORM
There are some constants in the analysis of the rise in America’s divorce rates: 
Americans place a high value on individual rights (thus the popularity o f unilateral 
divorce), they believe in the pursuit of happiness in both its political and personal 
applications, and the unexpected rise in divorce rates since the 1970s has brought a 
concomitant rise in the number of single mothers and their children living in poverty. 
While this last has stirred a tremendous resurgence of interest in reinstating fault-based 
divorce laws, all efforts at reform have failed to produce significant changes to date.
In an article for First Things, Barbara DaFoe Whitehead cites many o f the often- 
heard arguments against reinstating fault based divorce laws: fault barriers will only 
lengthen the process for most couples who, in the end, will not stay together; litigation 
and its attendant costs to society will increase; many of our young people will decide to 
cohabitate rather than marry; and fault-based laws entrap abused women and children in 
family situations they can more readily escape under no-fault divorce laws. In this 
article, however, she also cites a fundamental reason for no-fault divorce being so widely
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accepted that reform o f no-fault has not been addressed: “the divorce revolution was a
cultural rather than a legal phenomenon.”1
In addition to this crucial observation, Whitehead also reminds us that while very
few would argue that no-fault has been good for us, neither will many support a return to
fault-based laws. In fact, no laws proposing reforms that include re-instituting fault have
passed any state legislature, and the resistance to the reforms seems specific to fault. For
Whitehead, the answer comes down to a disconnect between the cultural norm and the
proposed legislative reforms.
As long as Americans continue to view divorce as an individual and 
psychological event, ungovernable by any outside institutions or norms, 
fault law will be rejected . . .  O f course, political failure is not always a 
compelling reason to give up on a worthy cause, but it may recommend a 
rethinking o f tactics.2
To counter this cultural disconnect in our search for relief from the woes of 
divorce without the social backing to legally prevent easy divorces, Whitehead 
specifically calls for a renewed commitment to marriage by women and the clergy along 
with a marriage-saving bias on the part of marriage and family counselors. While this 
tack obviously leads in the direction away from divorce in the long term, it is does 
nothing  to alleviate the worst outcomes of unilateral divorces in the short term, namely 
the economic abandonment o f mothers and their children.
1 Whitehead, Barbara DaFoe, First Things, “End No-Fault Divorce?” August/
September 1997.
2 Ibid.
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Consequently, some form of divorce reform acceptable to the public at large must 
be crafted as a stop gap measure until our culture embraces a “divorce is bad for you” 
norm. The challenge now becomes creating a policy that will negate the consequences of 
unilateral no-fault divorce, while most effectively satisfying the diversify of interested 
parties whose opinions on the best means for success vary widely.
The Failed Call for No-Fault Divorce Reform
In analyzing the recent pushes, both academic and political, for divorce reform, it 
is easy to see why so much of the effort of the 1990s failed if we regard no-fault divorce 
reform of the 1970s as a cultural phenomenon. While most groups have initiated their 
efforts in behalf of children, a large part of their emphasis has often been on a return to 
fault which is unpalatable to the public. For instance, in his bleak article, "The Family: 
Where Do We Go from Here?" Allan Carlson recommends radical changes in both no- 
fault divorce and family law, some of which might be acceptable if he did not also call for 
making divorces extremely hard to obtain. His recommendations include:
1. Pro-family tax reform. Carlson favors larger per capita tax exemptions per 
family member; a reestablishment of income splitting for married couples; and 
greater progressivity in income tax rates.
2. An end to federal efforts to "reengineer gender roles"3 at home and in the 
workplace.
3 Carlson, 63.
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3. A caveat for employers to pay a higher family wage to employees who are 
heads of households.
4. Repeal of no-fault divorce laws which have "destroyed the sanctity of 
marriage."4 Divorce should be difficult to obtain, and the state should protect 
the party working to preserve the marriage.
5. Provisions that protect parental rights.
6. Deregulation of family economy by eliminating zoning restrictions on home 
businesses.s
Though their outlook is not as gloomy nor as strident as Carlsonrs, the Council on 
Families in America makes some very similar recommendations to federal, state and local 
legislators:
1. Reform no-fault divorce laws to emphasize the importance of marriage 
especially where children are involved; give support of the law to the partner 
trying to save the marriage.
2. Formulate vision statements that establish goals to strengthen marriage and 
denounce out-of-wedlock childbirths.
3. Change the tax code to favor marriages, e.g., by eliminating the marriage 
penalty, increasing the personal exemption, and creating a $1,000 per child 
refundable tax credit.
4 Ibid., 64.
5 Ibi(L
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4. Provide funds (credits or vouchers) for parents who leave school or the 
workplace for an extended period o f time to care for young children.
5. Replace the welfare system with approaches that discourage unwed 
motherhood and that empower families, e.g., mandatory identification of 
fathers before benefits can be used, programs that encourage unwed teenage 
mothers to place their children up for adoption, favor mamages-with-children 
in the allocation of subsidized housing, and create a poverty tax credit 
whereby taxpayers could directly allocate a portion of their taxes to nonprofit 
organizations that work to reduce child poverty and strengthen families.
6. Reassess state and federal child support enforcement programs and foster 
more marriage and more fatherhood.
7. Provide an annual measurement o f the nations’ marital health using the 
following statistics: percent of adults married, percent o f first intact
marriages, numbered o f births to married parents, percent of children living 
with their natural parents, and percent of children living with two married 
parents.6
Within these two examples alone, it is possible to see common threads beyond a 
return to fault-based divorce that can be explored to fashion a reform o f policy that could 
help mitigate some o f the worst effects o f divorce without returning to a fault-based 
system.
6Council on Families in America, 313-314.
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The larger problem, however, remains: Americans still want easy divorces, and 
children will still be the victims of those divorces unless policies are instituted 
specifically to protect them. It is imperative, then, to create a policy that protects children 
from the worst consequences of divorce as we continue to search (through social, political 
and legal means) for a culturally acceptable divorce reform that will reduce the divorce 
rate.
Policy Recommendations
It is apparent that, at least to some degree, civic character and what it means to be 
a good citizen are a part of the theories underpinning the case for fault-based divorce 
policy. Supporters of fault-based divorce (both prior to 1970 and in the current debate to 
reform no-fault divorce) talk about the need to stem the rise in divorce rates because 
children of divorce have more difficulty in becoming responsible citizens o f society.
During the 1970s reform movement, proponents of traditional divorce law saw 
these obstacles to divorce as representing society's "valid interest in promoting family 
stability, pointing to statistics correlating broken homes with higher crane rates and 
increased welfare payments, as well as less tangible moral values."7 Today, the 
Republicans, the Democrats, the communitarians and other groups all use the same type 
o f argument in calling for reform of no-fault divorce. Galston points out that a key 
function of families in a  democracy is to provide the training of civic character for our 
children, and divorce in families with children creates environments where this type of
7 Wheeler, 8.
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training often does not occur. According to Galston teenage boys being raised without 
fathers "contributes to the low self-esteem, anger, violence and peer-bonding through 
gang lawlessness characteristic o f many fatherless boys."8 Additionally, Galston and 
Mason both argue that the negative effects o f divorce on children are long-lasting and 
serious, and that children of divorce have more difficulty than the average in forming 
relationships and developing bonds of trust.9 Correspondingly, Glendon summarise s  a 
Times Mirror study that finds that our current group of young people "knows less, cares 
less, [and] votes less" than anytime during this century.10
While the initial supporters of no-fault divorce purportedly focused on the issue of 
civic good, there is reason to doubt a firm commitment behind their arguments. For 
instance, in 1970, then-Govemor Brown appointed his Commission on the Family to 
proceed in a "concentrated assault on the high incidence o f divorce and its tragic 
consequences" in an attempt to right the social and economic ills o f divorce, namely 
juvenile delinquency, crime, alcoholism, and welfare dependency.11 This argument 
underlines the same basic principles as the proponents of fault-based divorce champion; 
however, it is clear the commission did not follow Governor Brown's adjuration, causing
8 Galston, 273.
9 See Galston, 274; Mason 45.
10 Mary Ann Glendon, "Virtue, Families, and Citizenship," in The Meaning of the 
Family in a Free Society, ed. W. Lawson Taitte (Dallas: The University of Texas at 
Dallas, 1991); as quoted by William A. Galston, "The Reinstitutionalization o f 
Marriage," in Promises to Keep, ed. David Popenoe (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1996) 274.
11 Weitzman, 18.
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some doubt that his reasons for appointing the commission were part o f the real 
motivation propelling the reform movement.
Rather, it appears that the motive behind the reform o f the fault-based divorce 
laws was one based more closely on equality and individual rights issues. According to 
Weitzman, society had presumably recognized that the high divorce rates were a part of 
life: divorce was inevitable. The real thrust o f the movement was to end the adversarial 
process, and to provide more equal treatment for both men and women in considerations 
o f child custody, and awards of child support and alimony.12 It does not appear that 
reducing the high divorce rates could have possibly been a realistic motive for the reform. 
As David Blankenhom, from the Institute for American Values, is quoted as saying, 
"When you change the laws to make divorce quick and easy, you don't need a PhD. to 
know what will happen. You’ll erode the American family."13
The failure o f states to implement divorce reform during the 1990s makes it 
obvious that our culture is not willing to support policies that return the nation to a 
divorce system based on fault Consequendy, framing the question in terms of the 
welfare o f children sets the stage for a very different look at whether or not reforming 
divorce policy itself (i.e., making divorce more difficult to obtain) is in fact the best 
answer to mitigating the effects of divorce.
At this point, consideration for cultural norms is vitally important in the analysis 
and to the success o f any subsequent policy. For instance, while an objective for the
12 Ibid., 16-17.
13 Hanna Rosin, "Separation Anxiety," The New Republic, May 6,1996: 14.
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problem might be to lower the divorce rate so that children grow up in intact families, the 
cultural norm clearly will not support a return to older systems that made divorce more 
difficult to obtain. To be effective, points of legislation must reconcile with the cultural 
norm as it exists, not as we wish it to be.
Furthermore, the argument can be made that there are contending goals from at 
least three basic theories strongly affecting the formulation of any effective divorce 
reform policy: the goal of personal happiness (from rights-based theories), the goal of 
equal treatment (from duty-based theories), and the goal of reducing the adverse impact 
of divorce on society (from goal-based theories).
With this in mind, it becomes possible to see ways of opening new avenues of 
discourse in the debate over divorce reform by determining where the values of these 
theories overlap. For instance, only extreme individualists would argue that good 
citizenship (civic virtue) has no place in society; few people would consider it desirable 
to have a large culture of children growing up in poverty; and most people would agree 
that children should not be treated as means (i.e., pawns that parents use in hurting each 
other, or for obtaining larger shares of property distribution) but are ends in and of 
themselves.14
Consequently, fixture endeavors at policy reform should focus on protecting 
children’s rights leaving fault and no-fault arguments out of the debate entirely. 
Additionally, divorce is a nationwide problem, and divorce reform should be crafted at
14 Other aspects not considered in this thesis include goals to maintain the power 
structure (men over women); goals to alter the status o f the welfare state (tax reform 
initiatives  to lessen welfare dependency o f divorced mothers); and goals reflecting the 
proper function o f government.
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the national level to set a minimum standard for all states through a uniform divorce act, 
or perhaps even better, through a uniform children-of-divorce protection, act.
We are beginning to see an acceptance o f this at the national level already. In 
August, 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
into public law.15 This law requires states to:
• operate child support enforcement programs in order to receive federal welfare 
funds;
•  reduce welfare benefits by at least 25% for mothers who refuse to help 
establish paternity;
• streamline the process for establishing paternity and expanding the in-hospital 
paternity establishment program;
• implement expedited procedures for child support enforcement; establishing a
Federal Case Registry and a National Directory o f New Hires to track
"deadbeat" parents who cross state lines to avoid paying child support;
• develop uniform rules, procedures, and forms for interstate child support
cases; and
• to increase child support collections by revoking driver's and professional 
licenses, garnishing wages, and seizing assets.16
15 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pulblic Law 104-193, August 22, 1996 (online); accessed on 12 April 2000; available 
from http://wwwiihs.gov/news/press/1999pres/990803bJitml.
16 Ibid.
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The 1996 act is a recognition o f the consequences o f divorce as a national problem, and 
demonstrates a willingness to act at that level, making it easier to create a uniform act to 
protect children before a divorce occurs.
Implementing a uniform act to protect children would not change current divorce 
laws for couples without children, but would protect the interests of the children of 
divorcing parents. The provisions of this hypothetical act would include mandates such 
as:
• A written plan (to which both parents agree) that clearly outlines custody and 
visitation arrangements.
• Property and other asset settlements that focus on the welfare o f the children 
first.
• Consideration o f the non-custodial parent’s potential for earnings in 
determining amounts o f child support.
•  Avenues for family courts to direct that child support payments be distributed 
directly and automatically from wages or bank accounts.
•  Language and strategies that explicitly enforce the non-custodial parent’s 
obligation for child support regardless o f new familial responsibilities that 
parent might choose (i.e., starting a new family with another partner, or 
assuming responsibility for a new partner’s children by a previous spouse).
•  Counseling both before and after the divorce that provides parenting advice 
and support for divorcing parents and their children. (While this counseling
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might be subsidized by the government, most of the cost should be defrayed 
by the divorcing couple.)
These mandates would hold for any divorce, no-fault or fault-based alike, and 
would not impede a unilateral divorce action, except to the extent that the above 
conditions are met before the divorce is finalized.
We can use Fineman's argument for "results-equality" as opposed to "rule- 
equality" in evaluating these proposals. Rather than evaluating the policy reform from 
the standpoint of individual equality, she asks whether the objectives of no-fault reform 
were met in terms of equity. In this way, she addresses the negative ramifications o f the 
fault-based reform that so adversely affected women. Fineman's point is that while 
individual equality for women is desirable in most situations, equity in terms of financial 
awards and property distributions is much more relevant in the case of divorce involving 
dependent children.17
Conclusion
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the initial divorce reform o f the 1970s was 
destined to engender devastating although unintended outcomes for so many o f the 
children of divorce. It also is clear that the underlying theories that motivated that reform 
-  the emphasis on the right to the pursuit of happiness that extends to the belief that 
divorce should be available to unhappy couples and should be easy to obtain -are still 
with us as a society today. Clearly, with the failure o f the reform efforts in the 1990s,
17 See Fineman, Chapter 10.
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America has shown it is not interested m divorce reform that affects the terms o f divorce, 
per se, and it has become apparent that there is really no cultural basis for returning to 
fault-based divorce. Consequently, it is imperative to find other means o f mitigating the 
effects of divorce policies as they stand today.
The welfare of children of divorce, the one inescapable consequence o f divorce 
that must be dealt with, provides an avenue for drawing all factions closer to consensus 
on reform to current policies. By building on whatever consensus can be achieved, it 
should be possible to draft a policy which minimizes the polarization o f thought that the 
current debate engenders: which keeps the responsibility for the children where it belongs 
— with their natural parents; and which avoids most, if  not all, unforeseen outcomes of 
policies that have not been well-planned and analyzed at the outset.
For our policy makers, the dilemma in creating divorce reform or child protection 
policies will continue to be one o f balancing the demands of a cultural norm based 
predominantly on individual rights with the need to preserve and nurture the future of our 
society. Given that Americans are not ready to accept divorce reform that significantly 
curtails their freedom to divorce, the issue clearly becomes the protection of our children: 
for their own sakes and for the sake o f our community as a whole.
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